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Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain
Sight: An Empirical Review of Central Bank
Independence
Timothy A. Canova*
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, it was easy to see the logic
of delegating monetary policy to private central bankers. It was
widely accepted that politicians could not be trusted with
monetary policy because of their short-term time horizons and
fixations on their next elections. They would be tempted to spike
the punch bowl just when central bankers, with their longer time
horizons, would be taking the punch bowl away from the party.1
The credibility of the Federal Reserve in helping maintain low
inflation seemed to confirm the conventional wisdom of keeping
central banks insulated from politics. Legal scholars have
largely deferred to this orthodox economics consensus on central
bank structure by avoiding the constitutional critique of broad
delegations to privately-directed central banks.2
But the
* Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law, Chapman
University School of Law. I am grateful to Len Baynes, dré cummings, Lynne Dallas,
Angela Harris, Christian Johnson, Joe Knight, Bob Kuttner, Martha McCluskey, Tayyab
Mahmud, Lawrence Mitchell, Athena Mutua, Frank Pasquale, Steve Ramirez, Nancy
Rapoport, Lynn Stout, and Mark Tushnet for key encouragement for my research agenda
on central banking in American law. I would also like to thank participants at the Class
Crits Workshop on “Rethinking Law and Economics” at the University of Buffalo Law
School and the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, and conferences on the financial
crisis held at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the Univeristy of Utah and St. John’s
University School of Law. In addition, I appreciate the lively discussion and helpful
comments I received at faculty workshops at the University of San Diego School of Law
and UCLA School of Law. I am indebted to Rebecca Laws, Aron Movroydis, and James
Moore for their able and timely research assistance. Finally, I thank Hannah Elisha,
Janelle Salamon, and Jennifer Fry for their editorial skill, and to the student members of
the Chapman Law Review for all their work to bring this article to publication. The views
expressed in this article are entirely my own.
1 William McChesney Martin, Federal Reserve chairman in the 1950s and 1960s, is
credited with the punch bowl aphorism. See N. Gregory Mankiw, How to Avoid Recession?
Let the Fed Work, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, (Sun. Money), at 4. Mankiw, a Republican
economist, downplayed the Federal Reserve’s failure to prevent the subprime mortgage
crisis through regulation. Id. Mankiw also defended the Fed’s easy monetary policy in
2007 as an attempt to avoid recession by “spiking the punch with grain alcohol when the
party starts to flag . . . .” Id.
2 The Federal Reserve is a privately-owned central bank;; each of the system’s
twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks is owned by private commercial member banks.
Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1982); THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 48, 50–53 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
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financial crisis and its continuing aftermath have shaken this
orthodox paradigm of central bank independence. Suddenly, it
seemed that central bankers were as prone to short-term herd
behavior as any politician, and that the Federal Reserve was not
all that independent of the private financial interests that
dominate its own governing boards.3 The line between regulator
and regulated industry had become blurred as the central bank
enabled the housing bubble with low interest rates and everlower lending standards, while abandoning any meaningful
oversight or supervisory role. Critics charge that the central
bank was not simply asleep at the wheel, but that it was an
active cheerleader in all that had gone wrong in inflating a huge
and unsustainable bubble. Since the collapse, the Federal
Reserve has showered trillions of dollars in subsidies on its
private constituencies, far exceeding all other subsidies and
stimulus packages passed by Congress combined.4
Indeed, since the financial crisis hit in 2008, the case for
autonomous central banking has been increasingly questioned,
even in financial circles.5 Others see no such lessons from the
financial collapse and subsequent bailouts. An article by Harout
Jack Samra warrants attention for combining the typical range
of flawed assumptions and problematic methodologies in arguing
for central bank independence.6
Part I of this essay will consider the economic authorities
relied upon by Samra, including David Ricardo and John
Sys. 2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND
FUNCTIONS 1947] (reporting that each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks is a private
corporation which serves a regional district and is obligated to “subscribe to the capital of
the Federal Reserve Banks”);; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA TO WORLD WAR II 258 (2002) (quoting a Chase
National Bank official, prior to the Act’s passage, that the Federal Reserve Act “will make
all incorporated banks together joint owners of a central dominating power”);; WILLIAM
GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 277
(1987) [hereinafter GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE] (describing “a privately controlled
network of regional reserve banks that would be given governmental powers”); RON PAUL,
END THE FED 23 (2009) (concluding that the Federal Reserve Act conferred “legal
legitimacy on a cartel of the largest bankers”).
3 The Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
includes the regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents who are appointed by boards of
directors which are in turn selected by private commercial banks in each regional district.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 3–4, 10 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. Publ’n Comm. ed., 9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 2005].
4 Div. of Supervision and Consumer Protection, The Fed. Deposit Corp., A Year in
Bank Supervision: 2008 and a Few of Its Lessons, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2009,
at 3, 7.
5 Clive Crook, Central Bankers Get with the Politics, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2010, at
13.
6 See generally Harout Jack Samra, Central Bank Autonomy in Latin America: A
Survey and Case Studies, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2009).
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Maynard Keynes, towering figures in the history of economic
thought.7
Samra overlooks conflicting views of Keynes in
particular.8 Although Keynes endorsed the autonomy of central
bankers he also argued that they should be motivated solely by
the public interest.9 Keynes also endorsed the nationalization of
the Bank of England and provided a theoretical framework for
neutralizing monetary policy and reigning in the authority of
central bankers and activating the fiscal capabilities of elected
branches of government.10 A fair and balanced discussion of
Keynes suggests, at the very least, that central bank governance
and monetary policy are far more complex matters than
presented by Samra and other proponents of central bank
independence.11 Consideration of the Keynesian model in action,
particularly during the 1940s, suggests that high economic
growth and low inflation need not be inconsistent with a more
accountable central bank.12 Meanwhile, the record of the Federal
Reserve’s more recent failures suggests that autonomous central
banking invites regulatory capture, financial instability, and
eventual financial collapse and bailout.13
Part II considers the empirical research relied upon by
Samra, including studies that purportedly correlate central bank
independence with lower inflation rates.14 The studies were all
conducted prior to the 2008 collapse and all mimicked the flaws
in the risk management models that contributed to the financial
crisis by relying on far too limited time periods of historical
data.15 By so doing, they overlooked the possibilities of so-called
“Black Swans”—those outlier events that do not fit neatly within
the bell-shaped curves of probabilities, but which do occur and
reoccur in history.16 Instead, the studies all engage in a crude
type of comparative analysis, comparing countries and inflation
rates while ignoring all potential non-monetary factors, such as
differences in regulatory and trade policies affecting consumer
price levels.
7 See generally GIANNI VAGGI & PETER GROENEWEGEN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC THOUGHT: FROM MERCANTILISM TO MONETARISM (2003).
8 See, e.g., Samra, supra note 6, at 69.
9 See infra Part I.
10 See infra Part I.
11 See infra Part I.
12 See infra Part I.
13 See infra Parts I & II.C.
14 See infra Part II.A.
15 See infra Part II.A; Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in
the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 381–82 (2009) [hereinafter Canova, Financial Market
Failure].
16 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE xxii–xxiii (2010).
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Perhaps a more fruitful approach would be longitudinal
studies that consider changes in one particular central bank’s
structure and macroeconomic performance over a longer time
period. For instance, by ignoring the data from the 1930s and
1940s for the United States in particular, the empirical literature
overlooks perhaps the most significant decade when the central
bank lacked de facto independence, inflation was kept low, and
economic growth rates were at an all-time high.17 Likewise, by
failing to consider more recent data from the 2000s, these studies
fail to appreciate the relationship between central bank
independence and agency capture, deregulation of lending
standards, growth of financial fragility and inflation of
unsustainable financial bubbles, and enormous subsidies to
favored financial constituents.18
Part III responds to Samra’s reliance on a book little-known
in the United States, Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot,19
written by three highly ideological Latin American journalists—a
book devoid of sources but long on name-calling.20 The economic
philosophy embedded in this book is a crude monetarism, one
which was refuted by the weight of empirical evidence in the
early 1980s when monetarists, led by Milton Friedman, wrongly
predicted a resurgence of inflation, and more recently by the
evidence of the past two years, in which inflation has not kept
pace with the huge expansion in the money supply precisely
because of the collapse in the velocity of money, a Keynesian
insight that monetarists conveniently overlook. But Samra and
The Perfect Idiot co-authors do not discuss such substantive
issues; rather, their ad hominem line of argument seems
intended to deflect and distract from substantive discussion. Part
IV concludes this article with a discussion of various proposals to
reform the structure of the Federal Reserve to make it more
accountable and transparent. Recent reforms in the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act are placed in
the context of various constitutional challenges to the Federal
Reserve.21 What has often been missing from both sides of the
central bank debate is an appreciation for nuance and the wide
spectrum of possible central bank structures. All too often the
choices are phrased as a false dichotomy between an independent
but captured central bank or one that is dominated by the
See, e.g., infra Parts I & II.A.
See infra Part II.
See generally PLINIO APULEYO MENDOZA, CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER & ALVARO
VARGAS LLOSA, GUIDE TO THE PERFECT LATIN AMERICAN IDIOT (Michaela Lajda Ames
trans., Madison Books 2000) (1996). Hereinafter The Perfect Idiot.
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part IV.
17
18
19
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politics of daily shifts in public opinion. In a diverse and
pluralistic society, surely there should be other, alternative
models that would achieve greater transparency and public
accountability without sacrificing the objectives of price stability
and economic growth.22
I. THE MISUSES OF HISTORY
Samra opens his article with a quote by Keynes that there is
“no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than
to debauch the currency.”23 This was from Keynes’ prophetic
1920 critique of the Versailles peace settlement, a critique that
recognized the inflationary dangers from imposing huge war
reparations on Germany.24 Defenders of central bank independence routinely point to the hyperinflation in Weimar Germany,
which did indeed destroy the foundations of middle class
prosperity, but they present highly selective evidence, ignore the
actual history, and therefore draw the wrong lessons. Contrary
to their arguments, the Weimar hyperinflation had little to do
with the structure of the central bank.
Rather, the root cause of the German hyperinflation of 1923,
like more recent bouts of high inflation in Latin America, was the
country’s inability to service its huge foreign debt rather than
any purported political control of the central bank. In May 1922,
responding to pressure from foreign creditors Britain and France,
Germany passed the Law on the Autonomy of the Reichsbank,
which made the central bank independent of government.25 As
recounted by David Marsh: “The granting of the Reichsbank’s
independence had no effect on controlling inflation, which ran at
1,300 percent in 1922.”26 In fact, it was this newly independent
central bank that printed paper money around the clock while
placing the blame for the continuing inflation squarely on the
Allied governments for making repayment of Germany’s debts

22 JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
900–01 (1934) (proposing reform of the Federal Reserve to include representation of all
economic stakeholders to give voice to a wide diversity of economic interests); LEON H.
KEYSERLING, MONEY, CREDIT, AND INTEREST RATES: THEIR GROSS MISMANAGEMENT BY
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: THE FED’S ASSIST TO INFLATION, RECESSIONS, AND
INJUSTICE AND THE READILY AVAILABLE REMEDIES IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WHOLE
ECONOMY 111 (Conf. on Econ. Progress, Washington, D.C., 1980) (proposing that Federal
Reserve Board of Governors and Federal Open Market Committee include fair
representation of “business, labor, farmers, [and] consumers”).
23 Samra, supra note 6, at 63.
24 Id. at 63 n.1.
25 DAVID MARSH, THE MOST POWERFUL BANK 81, 252 n.46 (1992).
26 Id. at 81.
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impossible when French and Belgian armies occupied the Ruhr,
the industrial heartland of Germany’s economy, in early 1923.27
It is unlikely that any central bank governance structure
could have prevented the 1923 German hyperinflation. The
Reichsbank was already autonomous, and, in 1924, the
hyperinflation was ended by the introduction of a new currency
and the so-called Dawes plan, which granted Germany a
temporary moratorium on its reparations payments.28 By 1933,
nearly a decade after the hyperinflation had ended and with an
even more independent central bank, the basis of German society
was once again overturned. Three years of Great Depression and
mass unemployment led to the rise of Hitler.29 Keynes himself
would focus his critique on the monetary orthodoxy that
contributed to depression and deflation, though he largely
ignored the implications for central bank structure in
implementing his alternative model.
The myth of Weimar hyperinflation should give pause to
simplistic uses of history that ignore the full context and range of
historical facts.30 Likewise, Samra offers a long quote by David
Ricardo from 1824 to suggest that Ricardo “advocated for greater
independence for monetary authorities.”31 However, in the quote
itself, Ricardo proposes delegating monetary authority to
commissioners “not removable from their official situation but by
a vote of one or both Houses of Parliament.”32 That would have
made Ricardo’s proposed monetary commissioners more
accountable than the regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents
sitting on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that

Id.
Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/Order,
and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1279, 1298–99, 1299 n.84 (2000)
[hereinafter Canova, Financial Liberalization].
29 ADAM FERGUSSON, WHEN MONEY DIES: THE NIGHTMARE OF THE WEIMAR
COLLAPSE 213 (1975); WILLIAM SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A
HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 94–111 (1985); William Krehm, The Bank of Canada—A
Misused Tool, in WILLIAM F. HIXSON, IT’S YOUR MONEY 121 app., 122 (1997) (discussing
Reichsbank’s refusal in 1930 “to make loans to the democratic German government unless
it fired its Finance Minister, the Socialist economist Rudolf Hilferding . . . [initiating] a
tight money policy that drove unemployment to 30% and paved the way for the Nazis to
come to power and World War II”). It was deflationist policies in Germany that paved the
way for Hitler and National Socialism. CONTRA KEYNES AND CAMBRIDGE: ESSAYS,
CORRESPONDENCE 36 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 1995).
30 Eric Foner suggests that historical truth is not fixed and permanent, and that fact
and interpretation can be sealed off from each other: “The very selection and ordering of
some ‘facts’ while ignoring others is itself an act of interpretation.” ERIC FONER, WHO
OWNS HISTORY? xvii (2002).
31 Samra, supra note 6, at 68.
32 Id.
27
28
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makes U.S. monetary policy.33 This is not to suggest that
Ricardo today would support making the Federal Reserve Bank
presidents more accountable, but rather to suggest the
uncertainties inherent in trying to find support for present-day
policies in the words of early economists.
Samra also asserts that Keynes “later adopted similar views
to Ricardo’s as to the benefits of central bank independence.”34
His only support for this assertion is an article by B.W. Fraser,
written when Fraser served as Governor of the Reserve Bank of
Australia, in which he quotes Keynes’ testimony before the 1913
Royal Commission regarding an Indian central bank.35 Although
Keynes endorsed the idea of providing such a central bank’s
executive officers with day-to-day independence, he also
suggested constraining that authority by “ultimate government
responsibility,” which is not exactly a ringing endorsement of
central bank goal independence.36 Yet, Samra equates Keynes’
testimony with support for central bank independence,
presumably of the variety now predominant in maintaining antiKeynesian policies in much of the world today.
To conclude that Keynes and Ricardo had similar views on
monetary governance and policy paints with too broad a brush.
Samra never mentions that the work of Keynes he relies on was
written decades before Keynes’ groundbreaking 1936 classic, The
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.37 It is
instructive to consider the evolution of and weaknesses in
Keynes’ views on monetary governance and policy as it highlights
the differences between autonomy and accountability as well as

33 Section 341 of the Federal Reserve Act provides for the appointment and dismissal
of the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks by the private boards of directors
of those regional Federal Reserve Banks. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). It
should also be noted that Ricardo’s plan for independent commissioners was never
adopted, the Bank of England continued to issue paper money and conduct monetary
policy for the next two centuries, and the United Kingdom was not beset by any
hyperinflations.
34 Samra, supra note 6, at 69.
35 B.W. Fraser, Central Bank Independence: What Does it Mean?, RESERVE BANK OF
AUSTRALIA BULLETIN 1, 2 (1994), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/
1994/dec/pdf/bu-1294-1.pdf. Fraser served as Governor from 1989 to 1996. Past & Present
Governors, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/history/
governors/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
36 Samra discusses the difference between goal independence and instrument
independence. Samra, supra note 6, at 79–82.
37 Hereinafter referred to as “The General Theory.” Samra refers to The Perfect Idiot
as “groundbreaking,”—and perhaps it is in the annals of mean-spirited satire and ad
hominem attacks. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, on the other
hand, was truly groundbreaking and is still considered by many as “[t]he most influential
macroeconomics book of the twentieth century.” LYNN TURGEON, THE SEARCH FOR
ECONOMICS AS A SCIENCE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 108 (Lynn Turgeon ed., 1996).
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the cultural sea change in public ethics between the time of
Keynes and the present.
In his 1926 essay, The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes
suggested that in many cases the ideal location of authority
would be “somewhere between the individual and the modern
State.”38 Progress would lie in the recognition and growth of
“semi-autonomous bodies within the State—bodies whose
criterion of action within their own field is solely the public good
as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of
private advantage are excluded . . . .”39 This hardly seems to
describe the monetary operations of today’s Federal Reserve and
other autonomous central banks. In just the past two years, the
Federal Reserve has purchased some $1.25 trillion of so-called
toxic assets from private financial institutions and extended
another $1.5 trillion in low-interest loans to those interests.40
There is certainly no reason to assume that motives of private
advantage have been excluded from these central bank decisions.
Rather, there are enormous conflicts of interest and
opportunities for private avarice inherent in today’s culture of
independent central banking.
In The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes spoke favorably of the
Bank of England as an example of the medieval conception of
autonomies—“bodies which in the ordinary course of affairs are
mainly autonomous within their prescribed limitations, but are
subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of the democracy

38 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), in ESSAYS IN
PERSUASION 312, 313 (1963).
39 Id. See also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 372, 374 (1936) [hereinafter KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY]
(decrying the large disparities in income and wealth that existed in his day).
The love of money as a possession—as distinguished from the love of money as
a means to the enjoyments and realities of life—will be recognised for what it
is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semipathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the
specialists in mental disease.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren (1930), in ESSAYS
IN PERSUASION, supra note 38, at 358, 369.
40 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FAQs: MBS Purchase Program,
http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/mbs_faq.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (reporting $1.25
trillion in Federal Reserve purchases of mortgage backed securities). The Federal
Reserve’s various emergency lending programs exceeded $1.6 trillion. Christian A.
Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S.
Financial Crisis 11 (Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584731 (reporting $112 billion in
Primary Credit Program; $493 billion in Term Auction Facility; $225.4 billion in Section
13(3) lending; $234 billion in Term Securities Lending Facility; $147 billion in Primary
Dealer Credit; $145 billion in Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual
Fund Liquidity Facility; $349 billion in Commercial Paper Funding Facility; and $48
billion in Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility).
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expressed through Parliament.”41 He was also quite clear that he
saw the central bank as motivated and incentivized to act in the
public interest by limiting the private avarice of its shareholders
to “conventionally adequate dividends.”42 Beyond paying such
dividends, “the direct interest of the management [of the Bank]
often consists in avoiding criticism from the public,” and that was
sufficient, according to Keynes, to ensure that Bank directors
would be motivated by the public interest.43
Keynes saw the Bank of England as merely an extreme
instance of institutions which were “socializing themselves”
because of their growing size, impact on others, and their concern
with their reputation and stability.44
This was a rather
optimistic and unrealistic view of the capacity of semiautonomous institutions and actors to constrain and regulate
themselves. According to Robert Skidelsky, Keynes’ view “was
driven by a belief in scientific expertise and personal
disinterestedness which now seems alarmingly naïve”45
[Keynes] accepted uncritically the view that captains of industry were
constrained, by the size of their undertakings, to serve the public
interest; and he assumed, without further argument, that an
interconnected elite of business managers, bankers, civil servants,
economists and scientists, all trained at Oxford and Cambridge and
imbued with a public service ethic, would come to run these organs of
state, whether private or public, and make them hum to the same
tune. He wanted to decentralize and devolve only down to the level of
Top People.46

The nuances and flaws of Keynes’ position on central
banking are not reflected in Samra’s portrayal. Keynes believed
that central banking could be removed not just from politics but
from the self-interest of bankers, and that it should “‘be regarded
as a kind of beneficent technique of scientific control such as
electricity or other branches of science are.’”47 For all his genius
in overturning the economic orthodoxy of his day, Keynes’
political philosophy rested on a somewhat flawed view of human
nature. He could wax eloquently about the eventual euthanasia

14.

41

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), supra note 38, at 313–

Id. at 315.
Id.
ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR 1920–
1937, at 227 (1992) [hereinafter SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS
SAVIOR]; JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), supra note 38, at 315.
45 SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, supra note 44, at
228.
46 Id. at 227–28.
47 Id. at 228 (quoting Keynes).
42
43
44
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of politics (as well as the euthanasia of the rentier48), but until
that bright future arrived, assumptions of political and financial
disinterestedness seemed premature. The result was an inherent
and recurring inconsistency in Keynes’ views on central banking.
For instance, in 1932 Keynes supported the Labour Party
plan for nationalization of the Bank of England, and yet he still
opposed “democratic interference” in its governance.49
Presumably, nationalization would do away with the paying of
dividends to Bank shareholders and thereby further undermine
the self-interested profit motive of Bank directors. Nonetheless,
Keynes wanted to protect the Bank’s day-to-day independence.50
If “it was the policy and not the structure of the Bank of England
which was at fault,” then to Keynes the remedy was to better
educate the Bank governors in the proper principles of monetary
management.51 His view on autonomous institutions cannot be
separated from his faith in an aristocracy of merit motivated
solely by the public interest and common good, an aristocracy of
obligations and duties and limits.52 How different from today’s
financial aristocracy—which has morphed into an increasingly
lawless and predatory oligarchy.53 Indeed, for centuries this has
been the very definition of oligarchy: an aristocracy that rules for
its own selfish advantage rather than primarily for the common
good.54
Keynes also articulated, albeit in incomplete form, what wise
and scientific economic management should look like during a
prolonged downturn or so-called liquidity trap.55 He bemoaned
48 KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 39, at 376. A rentier is a person
whose income comes mainly from property rents, bond interest or other investments. Id.
49 SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, supra note 44, at
437.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 This public-regarding view of aristocracy was articulated by Ortega y Gasset:
“Nobility is defined by the demands it makes on us—by obligations, by not rights.
Noblesse oblige.” JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 63 (Anonymous
trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1960) (1930).
53 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 120–21 (Pantheon Books 2010).
54 Leo Strauss, Plato, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33, 74 (Leo Strauss &
Joseph Cropsey eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 3d ed. 1987) (suggesting Plato’s view that the
difference between aristocracy and oligarchy is the difference “between lawfulness and
lawlessness”);; James E. Holton, Marcus Tullius Cicero, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 163 (discussing Cicero’s view that aristocracy contained “within
itself not only certain defects but even the seeds of its own destruction,” namely the
injustice and greed of oligarchy, its “depraved counterpart”);; Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi, in
HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 212 (discussing Alfarabi’s criticism of
oligarchy as a vile regime “in which the ultimate aim of the citizen is wealth and
prosperity for their own sakes”).
55 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), supra note 38, at
317.
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persistently high levels of unemployment and the tremendous
and arbitrary inequalities in income and wealth that undermined
the production and efficiency of the economic system.56 The cure,
he suggested, was an active fiscal policy accommodated by a
neutralized monetary policy, and implemented by deliberate
control of currency and credit by central institutions57—a policymix that both constrains and directs the goals and instruments of
central bankers and is therefore routinely seen as incompatible
with central bank independence.58
In The General Theory, Keynes provided the theoretical
framework for what would become the most active period in the
history of U.S. public finance.59 Keynes recognized that central
banks tend to concentrate on short-term interest rates, while
leaving the price of long-term debt instruments to the market.60
During a severe slump, he argued, the central bank should also
set interest rates at low levels for longer-term government
securities.61 This would accommodate much higher levels of
government borrowing and spending to stimulate the economy
and invest in long-term assets such as infrastructure, while also
pushing down long-term interest rates for private borrowers—a
framework completely at odds with Samra’s hostility to central
bank accommodation of large fiscal deficits and his vision of
central bank independence.62
This Keynesian model was followed in the United States
from 1941 to 1951, a decade of hyperactive fiscal policy and
neutralized monetary policy that finally pulled the U.S. economy
out of the Great Depression.63 Throughout this period, the
Federal Reserve was not independent in any de facto sense.
Instead, it took its monetary policy instructions from the White

Id. at 317–18.
Id.
For instance, Jácome decries a government’s direction of capital controls as an
imposition on central bank independence. Samra, supra note 6, at 79 (quoting Luis
Jácome H., Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America During the
1990s, at 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 01/212, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01212.pdf [hereinafter Jácome, Legal Central Bank
Independence].
59 See generally KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 39.
60 Id. at 206.
61 Id.
62 See Samra, supra note 6, at 74–77.
63 Robert Higgs, Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the
1940s, 52 J. ECO. HISTORY 41, 42 (1992) (“The entire episode of apparent business-cycle
expansion during the war years is understood by most writers as an obvious validation of
the simple Keynesian model: enormous government spending, with huge budget deficits,
spurred the military economy and produced multiplier effects on the civilian economy, the
upshot being increased employment, real output, and consumption and decreased
unemployment.”).
56
57
58
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House and the Treasury.64 Although the results were impressive,
with the highest economic growth decade in American history
coupled with low inflation, this history is strangely left out of
every empirical study cited by Samra. Instead, this 1940s decade
is apparently to be considered as an outlier, an aberration, to be
dismissed as the special circumstance of war even though it also
spanned the post-war period of reconstruction, the Marshall
Plan, and the G.I. Bill of Rights, massive fiscal programs that
altered the world for the better and ensured there would be no
return to depression economics.65
To appreciate the sea change in economic policy involved in
the Keynesian model, consider the metrics. Today, federal
spending is about 25% of GDP; in the 1940s, spending peaked at
nearly 45% of GDP.66 Today’s federal deficit is about 9% of GDP;
in the 1940s, the deficit peaked at about 31% of GDP.67 Today,
the federal debt held by the public is about 61% of GDP; in the
1940s, it peaked at over 113% of GDP.68 Those higher spending
and debt levels were sustainable precisely because the central

64 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2,
at 105; LESTER V. CHANDLER, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING 482–83 (5th ed.
1969).
65 Friedman and Schwartz dismiss the World War II high growth rates and low
inflation rates by attributing the post-war inflation to the war years. MILTON FRIEDMAN
& ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1960,
at 556–58 (1963). Higgs does much the same. Higgs, supra note 63, at 50, 52. Meltzer
refers to the pegged period as an anomaly and then dismisses the experience. ALLAN H.
MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: VOLUME 1: 1913–1951, at 738–39 (2003)
(quoting with approval from Allan Sproul, president of the New York Federal Reserve
Bank from 1941 to 1956 that “in war or in any other great emergency, the policy of the
central banking system must support the national plan of action. It seems to me equally
clear that in less emergent circumstances it is wise for government to set-up barriers or
buffers of protection of the central banking system from narrow political influence”). But
see HAROLD G. VATTER, THE U.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD WAR II 100–01 (1985) (relying on
C.R. Whittlesey’s 1948 assessment that it may have been a mistake to remove price
controls until civilian supply rose to meet pent-up demand).
66 National Priorities Project, Charts, Federal Outlays and Revenues, 1930–2015 as a
Percentage of the GDP, http://nationalpriorities.org/en/resources/federal-budget-101/
charts/general/federal-outlays-and-revenues-1930-2015-perc-gdp/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2011).
67 Trade, Exchange Rates, Budget Balances and Interest Rates, THE ECONOMIST,
July 29, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16702183?story_id=16702183;
ECONOMIC. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERS, app. 438 tbl.B-76 (1993), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/
erp/issue/1587/download/6006/ERP1993_Appendixes.pdf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2009, 24, tbl.1.2, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
budget/fy2009/pdf/hist.pdf.
68 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 2
(2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10521/2009BudgetUpdate_
Summary.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL DATA ON FEDERAL DEBT HELD BY THE
PUBLIC (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11766/2010_08_05_
FederalDebt.pdf; ECON. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67.
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bank was not independent. Known as the “pegged period” in
public finance, from 1942 to 1951 the Federal Reserve was
directed by the White House and Treasury to purchase
government securities in any amount and at any price needed to
peg interest rates at 3/8 of 1% on short-term Treasury borrowing
and 2.5% on long-term Treasury borrowing.69
Contrary to today’s Washington Consensus view, the Federal
Reserve’s loss of its independence in the 1940s did not coincide
with higher inflation. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy grew at real
annual rates of 15% or more for the three peak years and more
than doubled in output during the war.70 Private investment was
crowded in, not out. Industry boomed and businesses returned to
profitability. The United States emerged from the war with
enormous productive capacity, as the world’s largest creditor and
with huge trade surpluses, conditions which allowed it to play a
commanding role on the world stage. By the end of the war, with
the jobless rate at only 1.2%, full-employment was a reality for
perhaps the first and only time in American history, and the
distribution of income became much more equitable as a result of
the strong economy, low yields on Treasury securities, and
progressive taxation.71
During the 1940s period, the Federal Reserve lacked both
goal independence and instrument independence.72 The objectives of the interest rate peg were set by the Treasury, and
Congress directed a range of policy instruments. In particular,
the central bank was deprived of the blunt monetary instrument
of raising either short-term or long-term interest rates.73 In
69 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2,
at 105; CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 482–83.
70 Christopher J. Tassava, The American Economy During World War II, EH.NET
ENCYLOPEDIA, Feb. 2, 2010, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/tassava.WWII (last visited
Jan. 11, 2011); THE NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS PROGRAM ET AL., WORLD WAR II &
THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT: A NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS THEME STUDY 3 (Oct.
2007), available at http://www.nps.gov/ history/nhl/themes/HomefrontStudy.pdf.
71 LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC
THINKING AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR II 5 (1996). “The wealthiest 5 percent of
Americans had received 30 percent [of income] in 1929 . . . by 1944 their share was down
to 20.7 percent.” JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 685 (4th ed. 1977).
72 Samra, supra note 6, at 79–82 (discussing goal and instrument independence).
73 Since the Federal Reserve could no longer ratchet up interest rates to preempt
potential inflation during this pegged period, the federal government had to find new
ways to keep prices stable, including price controls. In addition, consumer purchasing
power and inflationary pressures were dampened by bond sales to the public and highly
progressive taxes. WILLIAM J. BARBER, DESIGNS WITHIN DISORDER: FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, THE ECONOMISTS, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1933–
1945, at 142–51 (1996). This approach to wartime finance had been urged by Keynes in
his plan on “how to pay for the war.” ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYES:
FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM 1937–1946, at 53 (2001) [hereinafter SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD
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addition, the Federal Reserve was directed to impose selective
credit controls and strict lending standards on its member banks,
including interest rate ceilings and prohibitions on checking and
savings deposits, and margin requirements on private borrowing
for purchases of corporate securities, housing, automobiles, and
other consumer durables—policy tools that complemented wage
and price control authority.74 Likewise, the Federal Reserve and
other central banks throughout the 1930s and 1940s were
directed to impose a range of foreign exchange controls and
engage in foreign currency operations.75 Moreover, the Treasury
Department assumed responsibility for exchange rate policy with
a stabilization fund that rivaled the Federal Reserve’s open
market portfolio in size, thereby allowing the Treasury to
circumvent the Federal Reserve, devalue the dollar, and relax
monetary policy.76 These controls, along with the neutralization
of monetary policy, were part of the model envisioned by Keynes
to help an economy reach full employment without inflation.77

KEYNES: FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM] (highlighting that the “Keynes Plan” which was
formalized by Keynes in an article published in The Times in November 1939, was in
essence a crystallization of Keynes’ ideology from as early as 1937).
74 CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 247–51, 484–85, 489–90; MELTZER, supra note 65, at
602–05 (recounting the Federal Reserve’s use of selective credit controls);; Arthur
Smithies, Uses of Selective Credit Controls, in UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY 94, 94–
105 (American Assembly ed., 1964) (indicating that selective credit controls might be
wise). For the theoretical underpinnings of Keynesian policy in the U.S., see generally J.
E. MEADE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY (C.J. Hitch ed., 1938).
75 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 65, at 471–72; MELTZER, supra note 65, at
461; FRED L. BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER 109–10 (1977);
CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 426–27.
76 MELTZER, supra note 65, at 457–59; CHANDLER, supra note 64, at 468–69. In the
conduct of its foreign currency operations, the Federal Reserve acts “in close cooperation
with the U.S. Treasury, which has overall responsibility for U.S. international financial
policy.” THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 63 (Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. ed., 8th ed. 1994) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1994]. Meanwhile, with a favorable balance of trade, there was
little need to sell Treasury debt abroad and an enhanced capability of spreading the debt
widely in the U.S. among the general public. See Spending Beyond Our Means: US Trade
Balance by Decade, MINT.COM (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.mint.com/blog/trends/spendingbeyond-our-means-us-trade-balance-by-decade (last visted Nov. 3, 2010) (showing a shift
in U.S. balance of payments from surplus to deficit); Franklin Noll, The United States
Public Debt, 1861 to 1975, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA fig.12 (Feb. 1, 2010, 6:21 PM),
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/noll.publicdebt (showing rise in foreign purchases of
Treasuries after U.S. payments go into deficit).
77 Keynes helped create Britain’s foreign exchange control system during World War
II. SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, supra note 73, at 74–77,
194. In the Bretton Woods negotiations that would create the International Monetary
Fund, Keynes and the assistant U.S. treasury secretary Harry Dexter White attempted to
construct a system of national exchange controls. LINDA MCQUAIG, THE CULT OF
IMPOTENCE: SELLING THE MYTH OF POWERLESSNESS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 223–34
(1998); James R. Crotty, On Keynes and Capital Flight, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 59, 62
(1983).
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All these various controls are today considered incompatible
with central bank independence.78 Yet, this model proved remarkably successful in keeping inflation of both consumer and
asset prices at relatively low rates, while delivering impressive
economic growth, high levels of employment, a more equitable
distribution of wealth and income, and a rising middle class
standard of living. Even after price controls ended in 1947,
inflation was only a temporary problem, and by 1949 prices were
falling across the board.79 This may well have reflected the
country’s expanded supply.80 “Federal spending did not simply
pump up demand; massive federal investments in infrastructure
and factories expanded the nation’s industrial capacity, thereby
reducing inflationary pressures.”81
In a study relied on by Samra, Luis Jácome argues against
the combination of de jure independence and de facto political
interference in the context of central banks in Brazil and
Venezuela, countries with markedly different political and
economic environments from the United States.82 Of course,
Jácome does not consider the more positive experience of the
Federal Reserve, which was legally independent in the 1940s, but
as a practical matter lacked de facto independence yet did not
lead to high inflation or other negative economic outcomes.83
Rather, the increased policy direction provided by Congress, the
Treasury, and the White House reflected a deeper discussion and
wider range of interests in the formulation of monetary policy.84

Fraser, supra note 35, at 5.
Historical Inflation Data from 1914 to the Present, INFLATIONDATA.COM,
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_curr
entPage=5 (last visted Nov. 3, 2010).
80 VATTER, supra note 65, at 100–01. For discussion on the end of the pegged period,
see Gerald A. Epstein & Juliet B. Schor, The Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord and the
Construction of the Postwar Monetary Regime in the United States, 7 SOCIAL CONCEPT 7,
7–48 (1995).
81 Timothy A. Canova, The Federal Reserve We Need, THE AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 11,
2010, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_federal_reserve_we_need [hereinafter
Canova, The Federal Reserve We Need].
82 Agustín Carstens & Luis Jácome H., Latin American Central Bank Reform:
Progress and Challenges 6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 05/114, 2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05114.pdf.
83 Inflation was kept low during the boom years of the 1940s. In fact, the annual
inflation was below three percent for the final three years of the war, from October 1942
to August 1945. BLUM ET AL., supra note 71, at 685 (“From October 1942 to the end of the
Pacific war, consumers’ prices rose only 8.7 percent.”).
84 John Commons, a leading Institutionalist economist of the 1930s, advocated for
such wider participation in the formulation of monetary policy. COMMONS, supra note 22,
at 900–01; Charles J. Whalen, Full Employment with Liberty: John R. Commons’
Perspective and Its Continuing Relevance, 44 J. ECO. ISSUES 559, 565 (2010). This was the
position of Leon Keyserling, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the
administration of President Harry S. Truman. KEYSERLING, supra note 22, at 111
78
79
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In more recent years, without such policy direction and input
from elected branches, the Federal Reserve has focused almost
exclusively on one policy objective (low consumer price inflation),
and has used only one policy instrument (changes in short-term
interest rates).85 All other policy objectives, such as maximizing
employment and ensuring financial stability, were secondary at
best, and often totally ignored.86 What a sharp contrast to the
1940s, when the political direction of policy goals and
instruments helped the Federal Reserve resist domination and
capture by its big bank constituency, which was crucial in
achieving a host of policy objectives, including full employment,
low inflation, and stability of the financial system.
If the 1940s was clearly the low point for central bank
independence, it was the high point for political accountability.
The Federal Reserve chairman during this period was Marriner
Eccles, a successful Utah banker whose support for higher
federal spending had anticipated the fiscal ideas of Keynes.87 In
the 1930s, he had pushed for structural reform of the Fed to
remove the “banker interest” from its crucial policy-making
Federal Open Market Committee.88 Although Eccles came up
short in that effort, he remained committed to a model of
governance that prevented the central bank from undermining
the Treasury’s fiscal program.89 Eccles and other Federal
Reserve governors demonstrated the ideals of self-restraint and
concern for the public good that Keynes assumed should motivate
the actions of autonomous central bankers.
Throughout the 1940s, the Federal Reserve’s willingness and
ability to accommodate huge Treasury deficits while imposing a
range of selective credit and capital controls reflected both its
relative independence from private financial interests and its
accountability to democratically elected institutions. This period
provides a model of what a democratically-accountable central
bank would look like when working with elected branches to
achieve the three primary objectives of Keynesian economics:
(1) maintaining genuine full-employment; (2) reducing the

(proposing that Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Federal Open Market
Committee include “fair representation of business, labor, farmers, [and] consumers”).
85 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Monetary Policy Objectives and Tools in a Low-Inflation Environment, Address at the
Revisiting Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Environment Conference (Oct. 15, 2010)
(highlighting that low inflation and short term interest rates have been the modern
standard, but noting that some consequences have arisen as a result of such a policy).
86 Id.
87 MELTZER, supra note 65, at 464–65.
88 Id. at 468–69, 476.
89 Id.
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tremendous inequalities in wealth and income that undermine
any sustainable recovery; and (3) putting an end to the
monopolistic structures and financial practices that harm
taxpayers and consumers alike.90
Unfortunately, few economists ever learn of this period in
Federal Reserve history. Not surprisingly, this most successful
decade in U.S. history is ignored by Samra and the empirical
studies upon which he relies, and has been all but airbrushed
from most mainstream texts, including the economics textbook
co-authored by the present Federal Reserve chairman, Ben
Bernanke.91 It is a telling omission that Bernanke, although
routinely hailed as an authority on the Great Depression, does
not mention the monetary regime—a politically-directed central
bank—that accommodated the hyperactive fiscal policy that
lifted the U.S. economy out of the Depression once and for all
after a decade of drift.
II. EMPIRICAL MYOPIA, BLACK SWANS, AND BLACK ELEPHANTS
Every empirical study relied on by Samra suffers the same
flaws of selective presentation of evidence and myopic focus on
limited variables and limited time periods. None of the studies
consider data from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, thereby avoiding
important “black swan” events, including the 1929 stock market
crash, the financial panics of the early 1930s, the Great
Depression, and the economic boom of the 1940s.92 In this way
they mimic the risk management models used by big banks and
credit rating agencies in the past decade to ignore the possibility
of sharp drops in asset prices.93 By dismissing such large
90 Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 373 (restating the primary
policy objectives of ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF
WELFARE ECONOMICS 3 (1947)).
91 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS (3d ed. 2007) (providing Federal Reserve and monetary history that includes
pre-pegged and post-pegged periods, but nothing on the pegged period itself); STEPHEN G.
CECCHETTI, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (2006) (avoiding any discussion
of the fiscal and monetary expansion of the pegged period). See also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL
OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS 280–81 tbl.B-1 (1996) (providing GDP statistics no earlier than
1959); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MACROECONOMICS 191–211 (18th
ed. 2005) (historical overview of the Federal Reserve and monetary policy omitting any
mention of pegged period); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 424–26 (6th ed. 2002)
(discussing federal deficits no earlier than 1970). Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve
encourages mis-education and ignorance of the pegged period through its financial
education and literacy programs as well as its practice of keeping hundreds of economists
on paid retainers while restricting the dissemination and scope of their research. ROBERT
D. AUERBACH, DECEPTION AND ABUSE AT THE FED: HENRY B. GONZALEZ BATTLES ALAN
GREENSPAN’S BANK 141–47 (2008).
92 See generally TALEB, supra note 16.
93 Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 381–82.
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historical events as outliers and aberrations, these risk models
effectively assumed that housing prices would always keep
rising. Likewise, Samra also ignored the more recent black
swans, the financial collapse of 2008 and its continuing
aftermath, as well as the rise of China as an economic power
without an independent central bank—events so recent and so
significant that to overlook them is more like missing a black
elephant than a black swan.94
A. Autistic Economics and Inflation Myopia
All of the studies relied on by Samra, and in fact all of the
many studies generated by the research departments of central
banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) confine their
analyses mostly to the 1980s and 1990s while overlooking any
and all non-monetary explanations for variations in inflation
rates. It is worth noting the professional affiliations of the
authors of many of the studies cited by Samra, most of whom
were associated with the IMF, World Bank, Bank for
International Settlements, and the Federal Reserve, institutions
with long-standing commitments to the model of central bank
independence, and in the case of the Federal Reserve, a direct
bureaucratic self-interest and perhaps a financial interest in
maintaining the model.95
In addition to the truncated period and focus of analysis,
these studies share a fixation on one variable: the rate of
consumer price inflation, while ignoring all other kinds of price
inflation, even hyperinflations of asset prices. This fixation on
one variable while ignoring all others is characteristic of the
orthodoxy in economics. In recent years, a critical movement has
developed within economics that challenges this orthodox
approach as “autistic” for pursuing econometric modeling as “an
end in itself” and thereby “cutting off economics from reality.”96
94 A “black elephant” is a combination of “the elephant sitting in the room,” which
everyone knows is important but is a taboo that no one will talk about, and “black swan,”
which is considered an extreme or unlikely event that undermines prior risk management
strategies. The black elephant has been defined as “an event which is extremely likely
and widely predicted by experts, but people attempt to pass it off as a black swan when it
finally happens.” Vinay Gupta, On Black Elephants, THE BUCKY-GANDHI DESIGN
INSTITUTION (Apr. 27, 2009, 8:31 AM), http://vinay.howtolivewiki.com/blog/flu/on-blackelephants-1450.
95 See, e.g., Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 5–6
(discussing Latin American structural reforms to comply with International Monetary
Fund “best practices” for central bank autonomy);; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING
GLOBALIZATION WORK 28, 57 (2006) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION
WORK].
96 POST-AUTISTIC
ECONOMICS
NEWSLETTER,
No.
1,
Sept.
2000,
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/wholeissues/issue1.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
Autism is characterized by a narrow range of interests, restricted use of language, lack of
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According to this critique, mainstream economics suffers from a
variety of symptoms of autism in its uncontrolled use of
mathematics, repetitive fixation with abstract econometric
modeling, and complete avoidance of social context and empirical
evidence, including historical facts, the functioning of
institutions, and the study of the behaviors and strategies of
agents.97 The studies relied on by Samra that attempt to
correlate central bank independence with low inflation are within
this autistic tradition: they ignore empirical evidence that would
correlate central bank independence with asset price inflations,
unsustainable financial bubbles, high levels of unemployment,
top-heavy distributions of income, agency capture, financial
fragility, and central bank subsidies for financial elites.
These studies are also based on flawed assumptions about
the nature and causes of consumer price inflation. Luis Jácome’s
2001 study assumes that “inflation is essentially a monetary
phenomenon”98 and focuses on three relatively brief periods:
1980–1989, when Latin American countries were beset by the socalled Third World debt crisis and sharply rising interest rates
on their foreign debts; and 1990–1995 and 1996–2000, periods of
recovery in much of Latin America thanks in large part to
resolution of the debt crisis and a revival in agriculture and
commodity exports.
The most recent episodes of high inflation in Latin America
have occurred in the context of foreign indebtedness and balance
of payments crises.99 Dependence on foreign bank loans, inflows
social reciprocity, inability to appreciate social context, repetitive behavior, repetitive use
of idiosyncratic language, and inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or
rituals. Diagnosis of Autism, AUTISM SPEAKS, http://www.autismspeaks.org/diagnosis/
index.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
97 POST-AUTISTIC ECONOMICS NEWSLETTER, supra note 96.
According to Marc
Lavoie, the post-autistic movement has criticized mainstream economics for “the
dogmatism of their teaching and the irrelevance of formalized models that seemed to
relate to some imaginary world rather than to the real world.” MARC LAVOIE,
INTRODUCTION TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS xiv (2006). See also Milton Friedman, in
CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADING ECONOMISTS: INTERPRETING MODERN MACROECONOMICS
124, 137 (Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane eds., 1999) (quoting Friedman that
“economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing
with real economic problems”).
98 Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 29 (asserting that
“inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon”). See also Samra, supra note 6, at 64
n.9 (citing to Jácome’s paper). Jácome finds a strong correlation between central bank
independence and low inflation during the 1991–2001 period, although that finding also
required that Argentina and Venezuela be excluded from the analysis. Jácome, Legal
Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 23–24.
99 Mark Weisbrot, Ctr. for Econ. & Pol’y Research, Latin America’s Electoral
Leftward Shift: The Importance of Economics, (Mar. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.cepr.net/events/200603_latam/2006_03_lagrowth_transcript.htm [hereinafter
Weisbrot, Latin America’s Electoral Leftward Shift] (providing the graphic charts which
accompany Weisbrot’s speech). There were serious inflations in the 1970s and 1980s in

Do Not Delete

256

3/17/2011 12:20 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:237

of portfolio capital, and the “dollarization” of domestic bank
accounts led to overvalued currencies and huge trade imbalances
financed by yet more capital inflows contributing to
unsustainable debt burdens.100 When interest rates rose and
painful adjustments were imposed by international bond markets
and International Monetary Fund loan conditions, everything
went in reverse. Collapsing currencies led to ever-rising prices of
imported goods, including necessities such as food and fuel, and
falling prices for exports, including exports of commodities in
particular. As countries found it increasingly difficult to meet
their debt service obligations and import bills, some responded by
printing money, leading to even higher inflation rates. Market
fundamentalists blame the central banks for monetizing debt
while ignoring the underlying causes that led to such poor
decisions.101 Moreover, monetizing debt in the middle of a
balance of payments and foreign debt crisis is very different from
monetizing debt to invest in real productive resources and
expand the industrial capacity and supply of a country.
Since Jácome begins with monetarist assumptions, it is not
surprising that he sees independent central banks and tighter
monetary policy as the only explanations for the low inflation
period.102 Foreign debt burdens and sharply higher interest
payments imposed from without are never addressed. According
to critics of Jácome’s approach, the failure “to control adequately
for other factors that might account for cross-country differences
in inflation” is a major deficiency in the literature that purports
to attribute low inflation to central bank independence.103 In
fact, Carl Walsh has noted one study that did control for other
potential determinants of inflation and “found little additional
role for central bank independence.”104
Significant non-monetary factors contributed to global
inflation in the 1970s in particular, including recurring balance
of payments crises and International Monetary Fund designed
adjustment.105 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. This was also a period of sharply
rising oil prices that had nothing to do with central bank structure or monetary policies in
Latin America, and which contributed to balance of payments problems, dependence on
foreign inflows of portfolio capital, falling currencies, and rising prices. Id.
100 Weisbrot, Latin America’s Electoral Leftward Shift, supra note 99 (providing the
graphic charts which accompany Weisbrot’s speech).
101 See Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 29–30.
102 See id. at 30.
103 Carl E. Walsh, Central Bank Independence, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 728, 730 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
104 Id.
105 See generally CHERYL PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1974).
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Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of oil in 1973 and
doubled the price of oil in 1979.106 As a result, Western banks
helped “recycle” the so-called petrodollars deposited by OPEC
countries into loans to Latin American and other Third World
countries, as developing countries were then called, so they could
continue paying for oil imports.107 But this recycling of petrodollars ended badly for most of Latin America when U.S. banks
raised interest rates sharply on their loans in the early 1980s.108
Studies by Jácome and others do not consider the following
counter-factual: if Latin American countries had independent
central banks at the time of the 1980s debt crisis, would such a
model have then been discredited and would the reforms then
have gone in the opposite direction leading to greater central
bank accountability which should then receive much of the credit
for all the good inflation numbers resulting from resolution of the
debt crisis and export-led recovery? In fact, Chile provides just
such a counter-factual example, although one would not realize
this by reading Samra’s ahistorical case study of Chile, as he
provides few dates and makes no attempt to correlate central
bank reforms with actual economic indicators.109
Although Chile’s central bank was made independent in the
early 1980s, average annual inflation exceeded 20% throughout
the 1980s and 17% through the mid-1990s.110 Moreover, Chilean
inflation was brought down to 6% a year in the late-1990s, but
not because of any change in central bank monetary vigilance.111
Rather, lower inflation rates coincided with increased regulation
of portfolio capital markets imposed by the elected government,
resulting in greater exchange rate and price stability.112 Chile’s
106 JEFFRY FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND RISE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 364, 368 (2006); Jack L. Hervey, Changing U.S. Trade Patterns, in HISTORY OF
THE U.S. ECONOMY SINCE WORLD WAR II 444, 446 (Harold G. Vatter & John F. Walker
eds., 1996).
107 GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE, supra note 2, at 340.
108 STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: HOW UNELECTED CENTRAL BANKERS
ARE GOVERNING THE CHANGED GLOBAL ECONOMY 22 (1995) (discussing the Reagan
administration’s approach to treating the debt crisis of four particular countries—Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, and Yugoslavia—as financial problems that demanded International
Monetary Fund austerity programs); GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE, supra note 2, at
437. See generally DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK (1984).
109 See Samra, supra note 6, at 84–86.
110 Eva Gutiérrez, Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank
Independence: Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean 16 tbl.3 (IMF, Working
Paper No. 03/53, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/
wp0353.pdf.
111 Id.
112 Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1621–22, 1626 (1999) [hereinafter
Canova, Banking and Financial Reform] (discussing Chile’s encaje program which
required foreign investors and lenders to deposit 30% of the investment or loan into a
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high inflation in the earlier period, and its disinflation in the
later period, had far less to do with central bank structure than
with foreign debt burdens, exchange rates, and the effectiveness
of financial regulation. As discussed above, Chile’s high inflation
rates of the 1980s occurred under an independent central bank,
and the disinflation of the 1990s occurred when the central
bank’s instrument independence was undermined by capital
controls.113 Yet Jácome does not consider any explanation other
than a crude monetarist one.
In another Jácome paper co-authored with Agustín Carstens
in 2005, the authors likewise have a relatively short view of
economic history, comparing changes in macroeconomic
indicators from the 1980s to 2003.114 Samra relies on this paper
in particular for his statement that “most scholars agree” that
central bank autonomy is “a sine qua non of monetary or price
stability.”115 If this is so, the statement says more about blind
orthodoxy than the merits of central bank independence. One is
hard pressed to find strong empirical support for such a sweeping
conclusion, which perhaps confuses cause and effect.116
According to Adam Posen, reforms leading to central bank
independence often reflect the presence of an already strong
political constituency for low inflation.117 For instance, as Latin
American countries pulled out of the debt crisis and experienced
a resurgence in their exports, the resulting economic growth may
have strengthened the political forces pushing for central bank
independence, as well as a host of other policies—such as trade

non-interest bearing account with the central bank for a full year or pay a 3% tax to
recover the deposit); GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 204 (2006) (discussing Chile’s break with
“free-market dogma” in the 1980s and turn to state promotion of exports and use of
regulatory laws “including some enacted by the vilified Allende government”).
113 See supra Part II.A.
114 Carstens & Jácome, supra note 82, at 15 tbl.6; Samra, supra note 6, at 65 n.12
(citing to Carstens & Jacome’s paper). The paper’s conclusion that central bank
independence explains the reduction in inflation once again ignores all other possible
explanations and empirical evidence from earlier periods. Carstens & Jácome, supra note
82, at 17.
115 Samra, supra note 6, at 65 & n.12.
116 Even Samra hedges this sweeping conclusion by referring to Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke’s caveat that “the evidence for developing countries is
more mixed.” Samra, supra note 6, at 69 (quoting Bernanke as stating that “the evidence
for developing countries is more mixed” with regard to the connection between central
bank independence and the promotion of low inflation).
117 Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 728, 730; Adam Posen, Why
Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix
for Politics, in 7 FINANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 40, 47 (Richard O’Brien ed.,
1993)).
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liberalization, fiscal austerity, and wage suppression—which
would also have contributed to lower inflation rates.118
Samra also relies on a study by Eva Gutiérrez arguing the
high inflation in Latin America during the late 1980s and early
1990s was caused by the region’s high fiscal deficits, which were
monetized by central banks that were pressured by elected
governments with short-term objectives.119
Gutiérrez also
attributes the decline in inflation in the 1990s to reforms that
made central banks more autonomous.120 Again, like all the
other studies relied on by Samra,121 Gutiérrez’ study does not
consider data from earlier key periods such as the 1940s and
early 1950s. Moreover, Gutiérrez even ignores the high economic
growth rates and low inflation rates across Latin America during
the 1960s, prior to central bank independence, and the OPEC oil
price hikes and the ensuing debt crisis.122 Moreover, like Jácome,
she does not consider any other factors that may have led to later
declines in inflation and improvements in economic growth such
as the resolution of Latin America’s debt crisis and higher export
earnings.
118 See Michael Parkin, Inflation, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 293, 299 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008)
(discussing fiscal causes of inflation).
119 See Gutiérrez, supra note 110, at 15 (stating that inflation during the 1980s and
early 1990s was, at root, due to the high fiscal deficits that were financed by monetization
by central banks).
120 See id. at 16, 23 (linking lower inflation to “entrench[ing] the independence of the
central bank in the constitution”).
121 See, e.g., Luis I. Jácome & Francisco Vásquez, Any Link Between Legal Central
Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean 12
tbl.1, 15 fig.2, 16 tbl.3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 05/75, 2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0575.pdf (focusing on data from the
1990s); Samra, supra note 6, at 71 n.43 (citing to Jácome & Vásquez’ paper); Charles T.
Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, Commentary, Central Bank Independence: The Key to
Price Stability?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, Sept. 1, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2006/0901.pdf (focusing on the 1955–
2000 period); Samra, supra note 6, at 73 n.58 (citing to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland commentary); Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank
Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J.
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 151, 160 app. tbl.A1, 161 app. tbl.A2 (1993) (focusing on two
periods: 1955–1988 and 1973–1988); Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.56 (citing to Alesina &
Summers’ article);; Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting:
Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?, 1997 NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 19, 25
(1997), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer1997/neer197b.pdf (focusing
on the period of 1970 to the late 1990s); Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.53 (citing to Fuhrer’s
article).
122 See EDWIN WILLIAMSON, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 620 tbl.3 (rev.
ed. 2009) (reporting high economic growth rates across Latin America in the 1960s and
sharp declines in the 1980s); id. at 621 tbl.4 (reporting relative price stability across Latin
America in the 1960s, followed by huge increases in inflation in the 1970s and 1980s); id.
at 622 tbl.5, 623 tbl.6 (reporting rising total external debt levels across Latin America
from 1978 to 1984); id. at 624 tbl.7 (reporting rising external debt and debt service levels
across Latin America from 1975 to 1985).
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Likewise, Samra relies heavily on a study by Carlstrom and
Fuerst on the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, once considered the
least independent of central banks, which was made independent
in 1989 and now ranks among the more independent.123 The
country’s inflation rate fell from an average 7.6% in 1955–1988 to
2.7% in 1988–2000.124 Of course, the inflation numbers are
elevated for the early period simply by including the 1970s, the
peak years of inflation due in large part to successive price hikes
by OPEC, a global oil cartel.125
Carlstrom and Fuerst acknowledge that, with reference to
the United States, changes in central bank independence “were
not responsible for the large inflation run-up that occurred
during the 1970s in the United States and throughout the
world.”126 Likewise, the decline in U.S. inflation was “not caused
by changes in [Federal Reserve] independence but by other forces
that have lowered the worldwide inflation rate.”127 But,
apparently the authors saw no reason to extend those caveats to
New Zealand. Instead, Carlstrom and Fuerst must engage in
“holding everything else equal” to conclude that if New Zealand
had “an independence score” as high between 1955 and 1988 as it
does today, then annual inflation would have been 3.4% instead
of 7.6% during that period.128 Apparently, in this fictitious world,
the OPEC price increases and global inflation would simply have
ceased having any effect on the New Zealand economy.129
Carlstrom and Fuerst then broaden their conclusion beyond
New Zealand to the global economy once more: “[H]olding
everything else equal, the increase in central banks’
independence would have lowered the average inflation rate

Samra, supra note 6, at 73.
Carlstrom & Fuerst, supra note 121, at 1.
Vlad Grinkevich, OPEC Marks 50th Anniversary, FINANCIAL (Oct. 9, 2010),
http://www.finchannel.com/Main_News/Op-Ed/70381_OPEC_marks_50th_anniversary.
See also Andrew C. Udin, Slaying Goliath: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1327–28 (2001) (“A ‘cartel’ is an
association of producers and/or consumers of a certain product, formed for the purpose of
manipulating the product’s price in a given market . . . . OPEC is widely known as the
most prominent cartel in the international economy[.]”);; Tim McMahon, Inflation
Similarities Between the 2000s and the 1970s, INFLATIONDATA.COM (Apr. 21, 2006),
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Articles/2000_vs_1970s.asp (noting that in the
1970s, inflation rates had surpassed 14%); John Keefe, What Causes Inflation? Lessons
from
the
1970s,
Vol.3,
CBS
MONEYWATCH.COM
(May
26,
2009),
http://moneywatch.bnet.com/economic-news/blog/macro-view/what-causes-inflationlessons from-the-1970s-vol-3/553/ (“Many people who lived through the 1970s associate
high inflation with sharply higher oil prices, due to an embargo on Arab oil in 1973.”).
126 Carlstrom & Fuerst, supra note 121, at 3.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2.
129 See supra note 125.
123
124
125
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worldwide from 5.6% to 3.8%.”130 Again, there is no discussion
about how central bank independence would have prevented the
OPEC countries from forming a cartel and raising global oil
prices. They offer caveats that central bank independence was
not the only factor in reducing inflation rates and that the impact
of independence is more mercurial in developing nations.131 But
it is telling that such caveats are hedged in their conclusion
section, which offers the definitive statement that central bank
independence is the “most effective way” to ensure low inflation
and that “nearly 2 percentage points of developed countries’
average decline in inflation over time is the direct results [sic] of
their central banks’ increased independence.”132 Here we see a
pattern of studied ignorance: all non-monetary factors must be
ignored to maintain the case for central bank independence.
Likewise, Samra relies on a study by Larry Summers and
Alberto Alesina, finding a strong relationship between central
bank independence and lower inflation across more than a dozen
industrialized countries.133 According to this study, countries
with high degrees of central bank independence generally had
lower inflation rates than countries with less independent central

Id.
Carlstrom & Fuerst, supra note 121, at 1–3.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 159, 160–61 tbls.A1 & A2 (analyzing the
independence of various countries’ central banks and concluding that “[t]hese results
suggest that the monetary discipline associated with central bank independence reduces
the level and variability of inflation”). As Deputy Secretary, and then Secretary, of the
Treasury from 1999–2001, Summers played an active role in pushing central bank
independence around the world and deregulation of banking and derivatives in the
United States. See Lawrence H. Summers: Director of the National Economic Council and
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/director (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
See also Joshua Zumbrun, Clinton Calls Advice He Got on Derivatives ‘Wrong’ (Update1),
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2010, 7:07 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-04-19/clinton-calls-advice-he-got-on-derivatives-wrong-update1-.html
(“[Summers’] argument was that derivatives didn’t need transparency because they were
‘expensive and sophisticated and only a handful of people will buy them and they don’t
need any extra protection’ . . . .”). Summers stated in an interview that
we’ve got a very clear sense, as I know the Fed does, of the respective roles of
national fiscal authorities and national central banks. And that has got to be
premised on a central bank’s independence. It’s got to be premised on a central
bank’s making judgments about overall monetary and financial policy, not
about specific subsidies.
David Wessel, Larry Summers on Ben Bernanke–Sort of, REAL TIME ECONOMICS
(Apr. 14, 2009, 8:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/04/14/larry-summers-onben-bernanke-sort-of/. At the time of this writing, he is director of the White House
National Economic Council. See Lawrence H. Summers: Director of the National Economic
Council and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
COUNCIL, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/director (last visited Oct. 23,
2010).
130
131
132
133
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banks.134 But this conclusion is easily dispelled by expanding the
time frame of the longitudinal studies and considering nonmonetary factors. For instance, the annual inflation rate in the
United States averaged about 6% during the 1941–1951 decade,
when the Federal Reserve was politically-directed.135 This was
roughly the average annual U.S. inflation rate for the 1973–1988
period, when the Federal Reserve enjoyed far more independence.136 Perhaps Samra would object to including the
inflationary 1970s in such a comparison, but of course that is
exactly what all of these self-serving studies have been doing to
impugn the record of politically accountable central banks in
Latin America.
Although Samra asserts that “most scholars agree” that
central bank autonomy is closely correlated with lower inflation,
the actual evidence is far less clear.137 Eiffinger and de Haan
present the findings of more than two dozen studies, not one of
which considers the empirical evidence prior to 1950, thereby
ignoring the most important decade of the twentieth century, as
discussed above, when the Federal Reserve and other central
banks lacked independence while supporting the century’s
highest economic growth rates and low inflation rates.138 Even
with such limited time frames, the studies were less than
uniform in finding any statistical relation between central-bank
independence and inflation, and many found no relation between
central-bank independence and economic growth, interest rates,
or budget deficits.139
In summarizing the empirical studies, including the
Allesina/Summers study, Carl Walsh has stated that “[a]mong
developed economies, central bank independence was found to be
negatively correlated with average inflation.”140 Walsh noted,
however, that data supporting this contention was based on “the
high inflation years of the 1970s.”141 In addition, the studies
mostly omitted consideration of the 1950s and 1960s, and
completely overlooked the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, these

134
135

Part I.

Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 159.
Historical Inflation Data from 1914 to the Present, supra note 79. See also supra

Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 161 app. tbl.A2.
Samra, supra note 6, at 65.
Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob de Haan, Special Paper, The Political Economy
of Central-Bank Independence, PRINCETON INT’L FIN. SEC. 64–65 tbls.B1 & B2 (1996),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Special_Papers/SP19.pdf. See also supra
Part I (noting the period of 1941–1951).
139 Eijffinger & de Haan, supra note 138, at 66–69 tbls.B2–B4.
140 Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 728–29.
141 Id. at 729.
136
137
138
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studies have also been criticized for failing to consider any nonmonetary factors that might explain changes in inflation rates.142
Walsh further noted that for developing countries, when
“causality is difficult to establish; is inflation high because of
political interference that leads to rapid turnover of central bank
officials? Or are central bank officials tossed out because they
can’t keep inflation down?”143 Again, implicit in such questions is
the recognition that inflation may at times be caused by other
non-monetary factors beyond the control of central bankers. Yet
Samra indulges, quite uncritically, in monetarist assumptions.
He quotes at length from Milton Friedman denigrating such
possible causes of inflation as “‘greedy businessmen, grasping
trade unions, . . . Arab sheikhs, . . . or anything else that seems
remotely plausible.’”144 According to Friedman, any of these can
produce rising prices for individual goods or services, but “‘they
cannot produce rising prices for goods in general . . . . [T]hey
cannot produce continuing inflation.’”145 There is actually no
empirical analysis in Friedman’s argument; rather, this is
ideology and belief. There is no recognition that the quadrupling
of the price of just one item—petroleum—could have devastating
ripple effects throughout the economy, raising prices for goods in
general, particularly since that commodity is an input in the
production of so many other goods.146
Samra also quotes Friedman that
‘[t]here is probably no other proposition in economics that is as well
established’ as the principle that ‘[i]nflation occurs when the quantity
of money rises appreciably more rapidly than output, and the more
rapid the rise in quantity of money per unit of output, the greater the
rate of inflation.’147
142 Id. at 730. Although Samra quotes from Walsh’s summary at some length about
the definitions of goal independence and instrument independence, he does not discuss
the criticisms raised by Walsh about the empirical studies of developing countries related
to methodology, causation, scope of analysis, and underlying theory. See, e.g., Samra,
supra note 6, at 80.
143 See Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 728, 730.
144 See Samra, supra note 6, at 76 (quoting Friedman).
145 See id. (quoting Friedman).
146 James Galbraith disputes the view that the 1970s inflation somehow vindicates
Milton Friedman and undermines Keynesian economics. The inflation resulted from the
Vietnam War, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the rise of OPEC and major oil shocks in
1973–1974 and 1979; huge events that were much larger than any “monetary mischief.”
Therefore, the solution need not have been super-tight money, high interest rates, deep
recession, and even less accountability for central bankers. Rather, “[t]he renewed
application of less drastic measures might have been enough.” James K. Galbraith, We
Are All Keynesians Again: Why Ben Bernanke Isn’t Listening to Robert Samuelson, WASH.
MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2009) (reviewing ROBERT J. SAMUELSON, THE GREAT INFLATION AND
ITS AFTERMATH: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN AFFLUENCE (2008)).
147 See Samra, supra note 6, at 67 (quoting Friedman). This Friedman quote comes
from a chapter in which Friedman once again raises the history of the Weimar
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Samra fails to analyze the implications of Friedman’s
monetarist prescription, which would limit the discretion of
central bankers by tying them to a fixed rule for money,
essentially requiring that the Federal Reserve limit the growth of
monetary aggregates to about three percent a year, regardless of
the consequences.148 According to William Greider, Friedman’s
solution would have Congress “strip the Fed of its privileged
independence and enact legislative instructions for U.S.
monetary policy.”149 Samra is apparently unaware that this
crude monetarism, based as it is on a quantity theory of money,
was easily refuted in the early 1980s, when monetarists led by
Friedman wrongly predicted double-digit inflation would result
from an increase in the money supply and, instead, inflation
continued to fall.150 Various explanations—all non-monetary—
were offered by economists, from falling oil prices to a strong
dollar, and the Federal Reserve itself abandoned the monetarist
experiment in mid-1982.151
Friedman’s monetarism is also refuted by the evidence of the
past two years, during which time central banks around the
world, and the Federal Reserve in particular, have been trying
mightily to expand the money supply to ease credit conditions
and foster economic recovery.152 The result has not been a
resurgence of inflation. Quite the contrary, inflation has fallen to
near zero and the U.S. economy creeps dangerously close to
deflation.153
As the Federal Reserve itself recognizes, the velocity of
money—the frequency in which money is actually spent—can

hyperinflation without providing the important context that Germany was in the grips of
a balance of payments and foreign debt crisis, and that its central bank was already
autonomous. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY
194, 217 (1994).
148 GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE, supra note 2, at 91–92.
149 Id. at 91.
150 TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM, supra note 71, at 78–79; Nicholas Kaldor,
How Monetarism Failed, in HISTORY OF THE U.S. ECONOMY SINCE WORLD WAR II, supra
note 106, at 423–24; ROBERT LEKACHMAN, GREED IS NOT ENOUGH: REAGONOMICS 120–35
(1982); Timothy A. Canova, Inflation Hinges Not on M-1 Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1984,
at A20.
151 Andrew E. Busch, Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire, 27
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 451, 460 (1997) (attributing the decline in inflation to falling oil
prices engineered by the Saudis as part of a Reagan administration strategy to collapse
the Soviet economy); Andrew H. Bartels, Volcker’s Revolution at the Fed, in HISTORY OF
THE U.S. ECONOMY SINCE WORLD WAR II, supra note 106, at 422.
152 Johnson, supra note 40.
153 David Leonhardt, 2010, a Year of No Inflation, ECONOMIX BLOG, N.Y. TIMES,
(Sept. 13, 2010 8:45 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/2010-a-year-offalling-prices.
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vary quite dramatically.154 This was an insight of Keynes,
developed in his theory of “liquidity-preference,”155 that
monetarists like Friedman seem to overlook at critical times.156
For instance, as consumer and business confidence has declined
along with the economy during the past two years, there has
been a marked increase in hoarding by banks, businesses, and
consumers.157 Under such conditions, expansion of the money
supply will not necessarily translate into higher inflation or
higher economic growth. “The Fed has been pushing reserves
into the banking system in exchange for toxic assets while hoping
the banks will lend to consumers and businesses in an
environment of severe economic insecurity.”158 Marriner Eccles
himself had criticized this approach as “pushing on a string” and
largely ineffective.159
Although the quantity theory of money and other monetarist
assumptions have been widely discredited, many of the studies
relied on by Samra remain committed to these doctrines. In any
given context, changes in inflation rates may or may not have
anything to do with central bank structure and monetary policy,
and they may or may not be related to a host of non-monetary
factors. Unfortunately, for autistic economics, context does not

154 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1994, supra note 76, at
27 (reporting that when the velocity of money or credit changes unpredictably, “adherence
to the initial objectives for money or credit growth would lead to an undesirable outcome
for output or prices”).
155 KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 39, at 194–209.
156 In fairness, in Friedman’s academic work he recognizes periodic changes in money
velocity, including periods in which velocity has fallen quite significantly even as the
supply of money has increased and inflation has remained stable. FRIEDMAN &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 302, 307 (discussing a sharp decline in money velocity from
1929–1933); id. at 546 (discussing decline in money velocity during World War II). But in
Friedman’s less academic and more popular and polemical writings relied on by Samra,
there is not a word of mention about the velocity of money. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at
189–95, 202, 205–09, 219–22, 229–33, 235–37, 258–59, 264 (discussing money supply
growth and inflation without any mention of changes in the velocity of money). It could
be construed that the omission was motivated by Friedman’s political agenda and may be
lacking in intellectual honesty.
157 Jia Lynn Yang, Companies Pile Have the Cash But Not the Will to Hire, WASH.
POST, July 15, 2010, at A1 (reporting that “[n]on-financial companies are sitting on $1.8
trillion in cash, roughly one-quarter more than at the beginning of the recession”);; Daniel
Fisher, Excess Reserves Are the $1 Trillion Reminder of Crisis, FORBES BLOG (Aug. 5,
2010, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/08/05/excess-reserves-are-the-1trillion-reminder-of-crisis/ (reporting excess bank reserves at the Federal Reserve rose
from $1.9 billion in August 2008 to more than $1 trillion two years later).
158 Canova, The Federal Reserve We Need, supra note 81.
159 MELTZER, supra note 65, at 478 (discussing Eccles’ 1935 testimony to the House
Committee on Banking and Currency). Eccles recognized that central bank accommodation of large public deficits would prove far more effective than pushing reserves into
the banking system as long as the federal government spent wisely in putting people back
to work and investing in the long-term infrastructure needs of the nation.
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matter, and these studies fail to even consider non-monetary
factors in changes in inflation rates over time.160
B. Economic Growth and Income Distribution
The empirical literature on central bank independence is
limited and also quite flawed in its treatment of economic growth
and the distribution of income. Once again, the studies generally
narrow the time period of inquiry to reach unsound conclusions.
Moreover, all the studies relied on by Samra fail to even consider
the impact of central bank independence on distributions of
wealth and income.
For instance, in the study by Carlstrom and Fuerst on the
New Zealand experience, the authors fail to mention that the
1950s and 1960s was the longest period of sustained economic
growth in New Zealand history while inflation averaged about
four percent.161 Since the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was far
less independent during this period, it allowed the Labour
government to pursue Keynesian economics, social welfare,
employment protection, and the expansion of infrastructure to
serve economic, employment, and social development
objectives.162
This was also the trend in much of the advanced capitalist
world during the same period, including in the United States,
Canada, Japan, and much of Western Europe, where politicallydirected central banks were accommodating massive government
spending and social welfare programs, and high economic growth
rates.163 Yet, a study by Summers and Alesina found no
160 See, e.g., Historical U.S. Inflation Rate: 1914 to the Present, supra note 80;
VATTER, supra note 65, at 100.
161 JANE KELSEY, THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT? 160 (1997).
162 Id. at 23.
163 LINDA MCQUAIG, SHOOTING THE HIPPO: DEATH BY DEFICIT AND OTHER CANADIAN
MYTHS 220–28 (1995) (discussing the role of the Bank of Canada in accommodating public
spending and investment levels of “the golden era” of the late 1940s to early 1970s which
“represented a kind of historic compromise between powerful financial interests and the
working population”);; WILLIAM KREHM, A POWER UNTO ITSELF 26–27 (1993) (describing
the Bank of Canada’s pegging interest rates at 1.5% throughout the 1940s and 1950s,
perhaps the most vibrant period in all of Canada’s economic history to accommodate
active fiscal policies on education, housing, and infrastructure investment); WILLIAM F.
HIXSON, IT’S YOUR MONEY 124 (1997) (explaining how the Bank of Canada financed the
public’s purchases of Victory Bonds during World War II “to mobilize the idle real
resources of the nation—labor, materials, and plant—to win the war”);; Jagdish Bhagwati,
The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF.
7, 10 (1998) (pointing out that Western Europe and Japan returned to prosperity after
World War II, and China has enjoyed remarkable economic growth rates in recent years,
all without capital account convertibility); BLOCK, supra note 75, at 109 (noting that “[a]t
the beginning of the 1950s . . . no major European currency was convertible”);; MARGARET
GARRITSEN DE VRIES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT, 1945 TO 1986: THE IMF

Do Not Delete

2011]

3/17/2011 12:20 AM

Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight

267

correlation between central bank independence and higher
economic growth rates precisely because it did not consider any
data prior to 1955, but mostly focused on the period of 1973–
1988.164 How convenient to mostly ignore the three most
successful decades for politically directed central banks. For
instance, if we compare U.S. economic growth in the 1940s with
growth in more recent years, the conclusions are much different.
In fact, U.S. gross national product (GNP) grew at an average
rate of about 5.2% a year during the 1940s when the Federal
Reserve was politically-directed,165 compared with average
annual GNP growth of about 2.4% growth from 1973–1987 when
the Federal Reserve was far less accountable.166 Therefore, real
economic growth rates were more than twice as high when the
central bank was politically accountable compared with when it
had much greater autonomy.
According to Mark Weisbrot, real per capital growth in Latin
America rose 82% between 1960 and 1980, the period prior to
central bank independence; and only 9% from 1980 to 2000, the
period coinciding with reforms to independent central banks.167
This is an enormous decline in growth rates from about 4% a
year to less than 0.5%, not even high enough to keep pace with
population increases.
In country after country—Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Costa Rica—there were enormous
decelerations in economic activity with the onset of structural
reforms, including central bank independence, that were imposed
by the International Monetary Fund in the context of severe
balance of payments and foreign debt crises.168
Ha-Joon Chang concludes that the “bad old days” before
independent central banks was actually the most successful
period for developing countries, with per capita income growing
by 3% annually in the 1960s and 1970s, above the 1.7% annual
growth rates since the 1980s after central bank independence
EXPERIENCE 30–32 (1987) (chronicling reforms in various countries to make their
currencies legally convertible); BEGG ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH,
SUSTAINABLE REGIMES OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN ACCESSION COUNTRIES viii (indicating
that some larger Western European countries did not fully remove capital controls until
the 1990s).
164 Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.56–57; Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 160–
61 app. tbls.A1 & A2 (focusing on two periods, 1955–1988 and 1973–1988).
165 Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment, and Production, in ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS 197, 204 tbl.B-2 (1980),
available
at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/erp/issue/1383/download/5809/
ERP1980_Appendixes.pdf (providing the basis for the calculation of the 5.2% figure for
the 1941–1951 period by averaging the annual real GNP growth rates).
166 Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 161 app. tbl.A2.
167 Weisbrot, Latin America’s Electoral Leftward Shift, supra note 99 (providing the
graphic charts which accompany Weisbrot’s speech).
168 Id.
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and other neoliberal reforms were implemented.169 Chang also
points out that the average growth rate of developing countries
since the 1980s “would be even lower if we were to exclude China
and India,” two countries that have experienced tremendous
economic growth precisely by not embracing central bank
independence.170
China’s central bank is tightly controlled in a one-party state
and is perhaps the most politically directed central bank in the
world, with the state dictating the central bank’s objectives and
policy instruments.171 Yet, China has experienced the fastest
economic growth over a sustained period of time than any
country since the United States in the 1940s.172 Meanwhile,
inflation has not yet gotten out of hand. For instance, as Chinese
growth rates have pulled up real estate prices, the authorities
have imposed margin requirements and other selective credit
controls to prevent the asset bubble from getting out of hand.173
China’s central bank has also been directed to intervene in
foreign exchange markets to keep the Chinese currency
undervalued to the dollar, thereby helping the country amass
large trade and current account deficits by promoting
manufacturing and exports.174 China, India, and Malaysia were
among the very few Asian countries to avoid economic collapse
during the Asian currency contagion of the late 1990s by

169 HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 27 (2008).
170 Id.
171 C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS
TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 29 (2006); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE
WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 160 (1997).
172 G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal
System Survive?, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23, 23–24, 26 (2008), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63042/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-thefuture-of-the-west.
173 Joy C. Shaw, Beijing Acts to Limit Speculative Investing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19,
2010, at A15 (reporting an increase in margin requirements and lending rates by State
Council, China’s cabinet, rather than the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central
bank). Hong Kong’s central bank, which is more independent than the People’s Bank of
China, has been provided with selective credit control instruments and charged with
containing inflation of asset prices. Although these intrusions are often considered by
monetarists to be constraints on central bank prerogatives, such delegated authority has
provided the central bank with the tools to slow, if not completely prevent, the growth of a
housing bubble. Jonathan Cheng, Hong Kong Acts to Prevent Bubble, WALL ST. J., Oct.
24–25, 2009, at B2 (reporting that Hong Kong has managed so far “to sidestep the
troubles that beset the U.S. subprime mortgage market, thanks to a 30% down-payment
requirement that has been in place since 1991,” and was recently raised to 40% for the
high-end property market).
174 BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 171, at 90 (concluding that “undervaluation of the
Chinese currency since 2002 has exacerbated the underlying structural imbalance in
bilateral trade” and contributed to China’s current account surplus).
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imposing restrictions on short-term capital flows.175 Recall that
currency and capital controls are routinely criticized by
monetarist
scholars
as
intrusions
on
central bank
independence.176 Malaysia imposed capital controls over the
objections of its central bank governor and deputy governor, both
of whom reportedly resigned in protest.177 As Joseph Stiglitz
concluded, and the IMF finally conceded:178 “In retrospect, it was
clear that Malaysia’s capital controls allowed it to recover more
quickly, with a shallower downturn, and with a far smaller
legacy of national debt burdening future growth.”179 Meanwhile,
throughout the period of currency contagion in Asia, India’s
economy continued to grow at a rate in excess of 5% and China’s
economy grew at close to 8%.180
The empirical evidence demonstrates that in both good times
and bad, economic growth rates are higher when central banks
are subject to some political control. China’s emergence as an
economic powerhouse is particularly instructive: a politically
directed central bank has accommodated high economic growth
rates over a sustained period of time while helping to ensure
relative stability in asset prices and financial markets. This
compares favorably with the relative instability and slow growth
in the United States and other countries with captured central
banks.
It is also instructive to consider the relationship between
economic growth and income distribution. At times, economic
growth may be widely shared and contribute to more equitable
distributions of income; at other times, when based on policies
that restrict wide distributions, economic growth leads to less
income equality.181 Slow growth or negative growth is most often
associated with rising inequality.182 Unfortunately, none of the
175 STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 95, at 34; ROBIN HAHNEL,
PANIC RULES: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 88 (1999).
176 Samra, supra note 6, at 79 (quoting Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence,
supra note 58, at 20–22).
177 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 124 (2002) [hereinafter
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS].
178 Michael M. Phillips, IMF Concedes that Malaysia’s Controls over Capital Produced
Positive Results, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1999, at A21.
179 STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 177, at 125.
180 Id.
181 James Galbraith describes these negative outcomes as “growth with inequality”
and “poverty amidst plenty.” Email from James K. Galbraith, Professor, LBJ School of
Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, to Post-Keynesian list-serve (Aug. 12, 2000,
10:19),
available
at
http://www.mail-archive.com/pen-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu/
msg44810.html (discussing the CEPR paper World Bank Research Faulted).
182 The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
Progress has provided a useful critique of the failures of aggregate measurements of GDP,
income, consumption and wealth to reflect actual living standards and distributions of
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studies relied on by Samra considered the distributional
consequences of central bank structure. In fact, Samra’s ad
hominem attack was apparently triggered by a quote from my
own work pointing out that the Washington Consensus policy
agenda, which includes central bank independence, has coincided
with a significant redistribution of income and wealth from the
many at the bottom to the few at the top.183
Samra’s omission is unfortunate since empirical, theoretical,
and econometric research does exist which considers the
relationship between the goal independence of central banks and
distributional consequences. For instance, Beyond Inflation
Targeting provides sophisticated empirical and econometric
analyses by nearly two dozen economists, none of whom are
associated with the research departments of central banks or
other orthodox institutions.184
In particular, the volume
considers the distributional consequences of “inflation targeting,”
which, according to Gerald Epstein and Erinç Yeldan, is
considered “the new orthodoxy” approach, has been adopted by
some two dozen central banks, and is usually associated with
central bank independence.185 These and other studies conclude
that inflation targeting may have significant costs in terms of
lost output and mal-distributions of income and wealth, including
differential negative impact on the employment rates of women
relative to men and on the welfare of workers relative to owners
and managers.186

income, consumption and wealth. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL
FITOUSSI, MISMEASURING OUR LIVES: WHY GDP DOESN’T ADD UP 13–14 (2010).
183 Samra, supra note 6, at 74–75 (quoting Canova, Financial Liberalization, supra
note 28, at 1294).
184 BEYOND
INFLATION TARGETING: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS AND POLICY
ALTERNATIVES vii–xi (Gerald A. Epstein & A. Erinç Yeldan eds., 2009).
185 Gerald A. Epstein & A. Erinç Yeldan, Beyond Inflation Targeting: Assessing the
Impacts and Policy Alternatives, in BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING: ASSESSING THE
IMPACTS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 184, at 3–4 (defining the inflation
targeting policy framework as “‘the public announcement of inflation targets coupled with
a credible and accountable commitment on the part of government policy authorities to
the achievement of these targets’”) (quoting Mark Setterfield, Is Inflation Targeting
Compatible with Post Keynesian Economics?, 28 J. OF POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 653, 653–71
(2006) and citing to studies by Bernanke, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel).
186 Epstein & Yeldan, Beyond Inflation Targeting, supra note 185, at 8; Elissa
Braunstein & James Heintz, The Gendered Political Economy of Inflation Targeting:
Assessing Its Impacts on Employment, in BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING, supra note 184,
at 110–12 (concluding that in middle- and low-income countries dealing with demand-pull
inflation, inflation targeting may undermine economic growth); Arjun Jayadev, Income,
Class and Preferences Towards Anti-inflation and Anti-unemployment Policies, in BEYOND
INFLATION TARGETING, supra note 184, at 87 (finding systematically differential effects on
the welfare of workers compared with owners, and on different segments of the working
class). See also Jose Antonio Cordero, Economic Growth Under Alternative Monetary
Regimes: Inflation Targeting vs. Real Exchange Rate Targeting, 22 INT’L REV. OF APPLIED
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In Latin America, the region on which Samra focuses, levels
of income inequality are among the highest in the world, and the
levels of poverty have skyrocketed in the present period of
independent central banks.187 James Galbraith and the
University of Texas Inequality Project have identified a range of
policies that undermine growth and equality, namely “policies of
tearing down social institutions that provide health care,
education, housing, food and direct support for the wages of lowincome workers,” as well as the deregulation of capital markets
that lead to inevitable financial crises.188 Unaccountable central
bankers are more likely to pursue the range of these policies by
catering to elite financial interests and by limiting the ability of
elected governments to expand budgets and avoid fiscal
austerity.
Unfortunately, questions of growth and distribution are
hardly asked by Samra and are entirely missing in his four case
studies. Among the research he relies upon, the few who discuss
such issues, like Larry Summers, follow the same flawed
empirical methodology based on truncated periods of analysis.189
This outdated orthodox approach, shared by monetarism and
debased forms of Keynesianism, has simply ignored the
numerous studies that correlate central bank independence with
slow growth and rising levels of income inequality.190 The
orthodoxy ignores distributional questions and entrenches itself
in abstract ignorance. This is once again a case of autistic
economics, oblivious to larger social or historical contexts and
apparently mesmerized by the elegance of their mathematical
abstractions.

ECON. 145, 145–60 (2008) (using econometric analysis to conclude that inflation targeting
undermines growth and employment).
187 2009 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 64–65 tbl.2.7 (Data Dev. Grp., The World
Bank ed., 2009) (reporting high and generally rising poverty rates); id. 72–73 tbl.2.9
(reporting high Gini coefficients throughout Latin America). See also James K. Galbraith
& Hyunsub Kum, Inequality and Economic Growth: Data Comparisons and Econometric
Tests, (Univ. of Texas Inequality Project, Working Paper No. 21, 2002), available at
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/papers/utip_21rv.pdf (finding that per capita GDP growth has
slowed in most countries since 1981 and there is a worldwide trend toward rising
inequality).
188 Galbraith, supra note 181 (discussing the CEPR paper World Bank Research
Faulted).
189 See Alesina & Summers, supra note 121, at 154; Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.56
(referencing the research findings of Alesina and Summers).
190 The British economist Joan Robinson, part of Keynes’ inner circle, coined the
phrase “bastard Keynesianism” to describe the early Keynesian models that departed
from Keynes’ original framework and sought to reconcile Keynesians and non-Keynesians
by conforming more closely to orthodox theory. SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE
ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, supra note 44, at 538, 621.
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C. Agency Capture, Financial Fragility, and Rigged Markets
There is a tendency among economists to dismiss empirical
data prior to 1950 as not relevant to today’s realities. The 1930s
was a depression decade, the 1940s was a wartime decade, and
both are seen as anomalies and the data from those periods are
treated as outliers.191 Perhaps it is understandable that Samra
would not recognize the salience of the pre-1952 period in U.S.
monetary history since it is no longer taught in most economics
departments and business schools.192 But there is certainly no
reason to ignore the post-2000 period, in which independent
central banks, led by the Federal Reserve, lowered interest rates
while relaxing all kinds of meaningful regulatory oversight,
resulting in an enormous hyperinflation of asset prices followed
by a bust of historic proportions. Throughout his brief for central
bank independence, Samra manages to avoid any mention of the
financial collapse of 2008 and the enormous ensuing financial
bailouts, which were engineered by privately-directed central
banks.
This blind spot fits within the genre of central bank
apologists. They missed the possibility of a black swan prior to
the financial collapse by ignoring the empirical data of the
financial collapse of 1929–1933; they now miss the black
elephant in the closet, the 2008 financial crisis itself and the
scale of the ongoing bailouts and hidden subsidies. They also
overlook how central bank independence has become a cover for
regulatory capture by private sector banking constituencies.193
As recognized by Samra, the Federal Reserve has come to
enjoy complete instrument independence as well as substantial
goal independence since its mandate as delegated by Congress is
191 Anti-Keynesians routinely dismiss the high economic growth and low inflation
rates of World War II by attributing the post-war inflation to the war years. FRIEDMAN &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 65, at 556–58. See generally Higgs, supra note 63. Meltzer himself
dismissed the 1940s as an anomaly. MELTZER, supra note 65, at 737–39 (quoting with
approval Allan Sproul, president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank from 1941 to
1956). Niall Ferguson’s myopia suggests that today’s anti-Keynesians have learned
nothing from the 1940s. Niall Ferguson, Today’s Modern Keynesians Learnt Nothing
Since the 1930s, FIN. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at 9.
192 This observation is based on numerous discussions the author has had over the
past two decades with faculty in economics departments and business schools around the
country about the coverage in their basic and advanced courses. The pre-1952 pegged
period is missing from mainstream texts used in those courses, and it appears rare for
faculty to supplement those deficient texts with readings on the pegged period.
193 Theories of agency capture easily explain the capture of central banks by their
commercial banking and financial constituencies. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECO. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983).

Do Not Delete

2011]

3/17/2011 12:20 AM

Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight

273

cast in broad terms with conflicting policy objectives.194 But such
broad delegations of power have only facilitated the Federal
Reserve’s capture by its big bank constituency. As Epstein and
Yeldan acknowledge, “in practice, ‘central bank independence’
means that central banks have become less accountable to their
governments, and, arguably, more accountable to financial elites
and international organizations such as the IMF.”195
Central bank independence does not occur in a vacuum; it is
adopted because of the presence of a strong political
constituency.196 The Federal Reserve’s most important political
constituency is comprised of the big banks that own and
dominate the regional Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal
Open Market Committee.197 This domination by private bankers
helps explain the “revolving door” that funnels bank economists
and lawyers into high level positions at the Federal Reserve and
routinely rewards Federal Reserve officials with lucrative private
sector opportunities.198 Although Samra relies on Milton
Friedman for the quantity theory of money, he ignores
Friedman’s strident criticism of the Federal Reserve as an agency
that has been captured by its big bank constituency.199
Samra quotes approvingly from the Guide to the Perfect
Latin American Idiot that “the fox in the henhouse is not the
businessman but the state, which is plucking the chickens
mercilessly.”200 Hardly any serious observer would accuse
businesspeople or industrialists, as opposed to bankers and
194 Samra, supra note 6, at 80 (quoting Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra
note 103, at 729); id. at 82 (discussing the Federal Reserve’s complete instrument
independence and noting that “it has complete discretion over when and to what extent to
make open market operations and other decisions”).
195 EPSTEIN & YELDAN, supra note 184, at 8. Likewise, Mark Weisbrot notes that the
CEO of JP Morgan sits on the board of the powerful New York Federal Reserve Bank.
The problem has been turned on its head as central banks are no longer independent from
powerful financial interests. Mark Weisbrot, Answer to the People, Not Greedy Elites, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2010, 23.00 GMT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/
cifamerica/2010/feb/15/argentina-central-bank-independent.
196 Walsh, Central Bank Independence, supra note 103, at 730 (discussing Posen,
supra note 117).
197 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1994, supra note 76, at
6–15.
198 Milton Friedman, The Case for Overhauling the Federal Reserve, CHALLENGE,
July–Aug. 1985, at 4, 6 [hereinafter Friedman, Overhauling the Fed] (criticizing the
Federal Reserve for “churning” its accounts by unnecessary buying and selling of
government securities to subsidize the bond-dealing operations of its private
constituency). See generally Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, & Christian Fons-Rosen,
Revolving Door Lobbyists (Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No 993,
Aug. 2010), available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0993.pdf.
199 According to Friedman, “no major institution in the United States has so poor a
record of performance over so long a period of time yet so high a public reputation as the
Federal Reserve.” Friedman, Overhauling the Fed, supra note 198, at 5.
200 Samra, supra note 6, at 75.

Do Not Delete

274

3/17/2011 12:20 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:237

financiers, of controlling central banks. In fact, for many years
critics of independent central banking have proposed including
representatives of industrial capital on the Federal Reserve’s
policymaking committees.201 Instead, as the structure of the
Federal Reserve shows quite clearly, it is private sector
commercial bankers and financial interests that dominate
through ownership and direction of the regional Federal Reserve
Banks.202 The most powerful of the regional Fed banks is the
New York Federal Reserve Bank, which over the past two years
has provided some $1.6 trillion in low interest loans, backed by
shaky collateral, to its member banks, while purchasing some
$1.25 trillion of their toxic assets and another $500 billion in
Treasury securities.203 Often referred to as “quantitative easing,”
the Federal Reserve’s large-scale purchase of assets has a direct
“qualitative” effect by providing direct financial assistance to the
private counterparties on these transactions.204 Along with selective release of insider information by Federal Reserve officials to
their favored investors (often former Fed officials), these are
among the many quid pro quos in a system of opaque subsidies
that are more suggestive of crony capitalism and rigged markets
than any free and fair playing field.205 It would appear that the
bankers themselves are playing the role of the fox plucking the
taxpayer-chickens in the central bank henhouse.206
In May 2008, former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker
expressed concern that the Federal Reserve’s independence could
be undermined by the wide variety of assets it had taken onto its
balance sheet to help its banking constituency. He was quoted in
COMMONS, supra note 22, at 900–01; KEYSERLING, supra note 22, at 111.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 7–15 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys. ed., 6th ed. 1974) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1974].
203 FAQs: MBS Purchase Program, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,
http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/mbs_FAQ.HTML (last updated Aug. 20, 2010) (reporting
$1.25 trillion in Federal Reserve purchases of mortgage backed securities). The Federal
Reserve’s various emergency lending programs exceeded $1.6 trillion. Johnson, supra note
40 (reporting $112 billion in Primary Credit Program; $493 billion in Term Auction
Facility; $225.4 billion in section 13(3) lending; $234 billion in Term Securities Lending
Facility; $147 billion in Primary Dealer Credit; $145 billion in Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility; $349 billion in Commercial Paper
Funding Facility; and $48 billion in Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility).
204 David Wessel, For Fed, Goosing Markets Is a Risk Worth Taking, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 2010, at A4.
205 Kristina Cooke et al., Special Report: The Ties that Bind at the Federal Reserve,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68S01020100930.
206 In analyzing central bank independence, Samra recognizes that a disproportionate
focus on formal legal structures “often fails to truly explain the full extent of political
interference in the central bank decision-making processes.” Samra, supra note 6, at 65.
Unfortunately, he does not apply such inquiry to the informal (and for that matter,
formal) mechanisms that allow private financial interests to interfere politically in central
bank governance.
201
202
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the Wall Street Journal as stating that the central bank might be
viewed “as the rescuer or supporter of a particular section of the
market [which] is not strictly a monetary function in the way it’s
been interpreted in the past.”207 This was nearly six months
before the New York Federal Reserve Bank, then headed by
Timothy Geithner, adopted many of the liquidity and open
market programs that greatly expanded its balance sheet further
to prop up its constituency.208 Volcker, long respected in financial circles, suddenly seemed increasingly out of touch with the
new normal of hidden subsidies for the financial oligarchy of big
banks and hedge funds.
B.W. Fraser, former governor of the Australian central bank,
argues that politicians cannot be trusted to direct monetary
policy because they are drawn to short-term monetary stimulus
that will fuel inflation: “Independent and longsighted central
bankers are needed to rescue politicians from this temptation.”209
Likewise, Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne conclude that
delegating monetary policy to independent central bankers
results in “better forecasts and fewer policy mistakes, which
increases social welfare.”210
Such glorifications of central
bankers seem naïve at best in light of their role in the financial
collapse and multi-trillion dollar subsidies to their financial
constituencies.211 It should now be clear that central bankers are
not independent from the big banks, and they are as shortsighted as any banking executive fixated on the next quarterly
report or daily stock price.
The Federal Reserve’s capture is also related to the larger
political culture in Washington. The politicians who continue to
delegate broad powers to the Federal Reserve are responding to
the agenda of the same big banks that exercise decisive influence
over the central bank. The lure of large campaign contributions,
surely a very short-term motive, is often enough to convince
elected officials to continue with such broad delegations and to

207
208

(2009).

Greg Ip, Fed Balance Sheet Worries Volcker, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2008, at A3.
DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 256

Fraser, supra note 35, at 2–3; Samra, supra note 6, at 71 (quoting Fraser).
Gauti Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank
Independence 5 (IMF, Working Paper No. 03/144, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03144.pdf; Samra, supra note 6, at 81
(quoting Eggerston & Le Borgne).
211 Samra offers a “pithy quote” from The Economist that “the only good central bank
is one that can say no to politicians.” Samra, supra note 6, at 72 n.52. Since the many
failures of the world’s leading central banks over the past decade, not least of all by the
Federal Reserve, perhaps this aphorism should be changed to “the only good central bank
is one that can say no to its big bank constituencies.”
209
210
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comply with the Wall Street agenda being pushed by the Federal
Reserve itself.212
Agency capture helps explain the Federal Reserve’s failure to
effectively monitor and supervise the lending practices of banks,
its efforts to undermine the Glass-Steagall firewalls between
commercial and investment banking, and its lobbying to further
deregulate markets for financial derivatives.213 Throughout the
Greenspan and Bernanke eras, at the height of its independence,
the Federal Reserve has served as the lapdog for Wall Street
interests rather than as a watchdog to prevent marketplace
abuses.
The deregulatory agenda pursued by the Federal Reserve,
and the financial innovations that resulted, were justified by a
variety of economic theories, including rational expectations, real
business cycle theory, and the efficient financial market theory—
all of which were discredited by the present financial crisis, but
all of which live on by force of momentum and career-long
commitments in the academy.214 According to numerous economic theorists and historians, the consequence of such financial
innovation is to markedly increase the fragility of the financial
system.215 A study by Gerald Epstein presents econometric
evidence correlating independent central banking with more
speculative financial markets and lower rates of capacity
utilization.216 The past two decades of independent central
banking witnessed a proliferation in financial innovations,
includeing the securitized asset-backed instruments and
financial derivatives that played an enormous role in the
financial panic, economic recession, and ongoing crisis.
D. Case Studies in Historical Context
The relationship between central bank independence and
financial fragility is not confined to the United States and other
wealthy countries. Samra notes that more than a dozen Latin
212 “The financial sector is far and away the largest source of campaign contributions
to federal candidates and parties, with insurance companies, securities and investment
firms, real estate interests and commercial banks providing the bulk of that money. The
sector
contributes
generous sums
to
both
parties . . . .”
Aaron
Kiersh,
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Background, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (last
updated
July
2009),
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/background.php?cycle=
2010&ind=F.
213 Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 384–87.
214 ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER 32–42 (2009).
215 See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2008);
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005).
216 Gerald Epstein, Political Economy and Comparative Central Banking, 24 REV.
RADICAL POL. ECON., no. 1, Spring 1992, at 1–30.
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American countries have implemented reforms strengthening
central bank independence in the past three decades.217 He
selects four of those countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and
Venezuela) as case studies, none of which seek to correlate
central bank reforms with changes in any economic indicators.218
All the case studies show are the legal changes that have
occurred to make central banks more or less independent. But a
closer look at the empirical evidence in these four countries
suggests the dangers of unaccountable and captured central
banks.
As discussed above, in Chile inflation rates rose in the 1980s
under an independent central bank and fell in the 1990s under a
regime of capital controls that restricted the central bank’s
instrument independence and helped shield the country from
successive currency contagions.219 Although Chile is seen as
more successful than many other Latin American countries, it
still suffers from high rates of unemployment and poverty and
top-heavy distributions of income.220
In Mexico, the central bank was reformed in 1993;221 in early
1995 the Mexican peso collapsed.222 Mexico, unlike Chile,
rejected capital controls.223 The impact of the peso crash and the
ensuing austerity was severe and added to the mass dislocations
arising from Mexico liberalizing its agricultural and other
markets as part of its implementation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).224 Today, after two decades
with an independent central bank, Mexico is a failing state,
fighting a drug war with the burdens of mass unemployment,
high poverty rates, and huge inequalities in wealth and

Samra, supra note 6, at 66.
Id. at 66, 82–85, 87, 90.
See supra notes 206–209 and accompanying text. See also Gutiérrez, supra note
110, at 16 tbl.3.; Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 112, at 1621–23,
1626 (discussing Chile’s encaje program which required foreign investors and lenders to
deposit thirty percent of the investment or loan into a non-interest bearing account with
the central bank for a full year or pay a three percent tax to recover the deposit);
GRANDIN, supra note 112, at 204 (discussing Chile’s break with free market dogma in the
1980s, turn to state promotion of exports and use of regulatory laws, “including some
enacted by the vilified Allende government”).
220 WORLD BANK, 2009 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 64–65 tbl.2.7 (2009)
(detailing poverty rates and reporting that one in five Chileans are below the poverty
line); id. at 72–73 tbl.2.9 (detailing “[d]istribution of income or consumption,” and
reporting high Gini coefficients for Chile).
221 Carstens & Jácome, supra note 82, at 4 n.3.
222 Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 112, at 1572.
223 Id. at 1625 n.224.
224 Id. at 1586–96; Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the Door:
Mobility, Adjustment, and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 344–
46 (2007) [hereinafter Canova, Closing the Border].
217
218
219
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income.225 It is difficult to understand how anyone could point to
Mexico as a success story for independent central banking, trade
liberalization, privatization, or other components of the
Washington Consensus policy agenda.
Argentina’s experience has been equally checkered; central
bank independence has coincided with years of persistently high
levels of unemployment, a wave of financial and political
corruption, an enormous financial crisis in 2001, and the
country’s worst economic collapse in a century.226 This led to the
election of a Peronist government that inherited more than 20%,
60% of the population below the poverty line, and 40% in extreme
poverty.227 Not surprisingly, the government turned to populist
measures, including open conflict with the central bank on the
use of foreign reserves to repay $10 billion to the International
Monetary Fund in 2009.228 Some months later, when the central
bank refused to comply with the government’s plan to use
$6.6 billion of foreign reserves to pay off other debt, President
Cristina Fernández fired the head of the central bank.229 How
has all this worked out for Argentina? A significant economic
recovery took hold as a result of a devalued peso, renewed
demand for Argentine agricultural exports, and increased social
spending by the government.230 According to Mark Weisbrot, it is
questionable whether Argentina could have begun “the
remarkable economic recovery that started in 2002, in which the
economy grew more than 60% in six years, if its central bankers
had the kind of independence that the U.S. Federal Reserve
has.”231
Samra ends his article with a discussion of Venezuela’s
central bank that serves as an extension of his diatribe against
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Once again, he fails to
place changes in central bank structure within the context of any
225 WORLD BANK, supra note 220, at 64–65 tbl.2.7 (detailing poverty rates and
reporting that one in five Mexicans are below the poverty line and rural poverty is at
about thirty percent); id. at 72–73 tbl.2.9 (detailing “[d]istribution of income or
consumption,” and reporting high Gini coefficients for Mexico).
226 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 583–84; STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS, supra note 177, at 18, 69; Roberto Frenkel & Martín Rapetti, Five Years of
Competitive and Stable Real Exchange Rate in Argentina, 2002–07, in BEYOND INFLATION
TARGETING, supra note 184, at 179–81.
227 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 584.
228 Id.
229 Mark Weisbrot, Answer to the People, Not Greedy Elites: Argentina’s President
Came Under Fire for Sacking the Head of the Central Bank—But Why Should Such
Institutions be ‘Independent’?, THE GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Feb. 15, 2010, 11:00 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/feb/15/argentina-central-bankindependent [hereinafter Weisbrot, Answer to the People].
230 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 584.
231 Weisbrot, Answer to the People, supra note 229.
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actual economic or financial developments. As Samra notes,
Venezuela’s central bank was given administrative autonomy in
the 1990s.232 He fails to mention that inflation in Venezuela was
markedly lower in the 1980s than the 1990s, and that inflation
rose significantly after reform of the central bank in December
1992.233 Annual inflation averaged about 21% in Venezuela
throughout the 1980s prior to the central bank reform, 44% from
1990–1995 as the central bank was being granted more
autonomy, and 45% from 1996–2000.234 These figures only
undermine Samra’s thesis that central bank independence is
correlated with low inflation.235
Others have criticized Venezuela’s 1992 reform as being
insufficient: the central bank was legally independent, but it was
subject to episodes of political interference, including the
government instituting capital controls, deposit insurance, and
requiring the central bank to turn over its profits.236 Although
the central bank was not as independent as Jácome and others
would have preferred, it was more independent than it would
become under Hugo Chávez, who is the particular subject of
Samra’s ire. Chávez, however, was not elected president until
December 1998, well after the relatively lower inflation rates of
the 1980s, prior to central bank independence, and after the
economic and financial upheavals of the 1990s that occurred
under an independent central bank.237
The pre-Chávez history of central bank reform in Venezuela
suggests that formal legal changes are often less significant than
underlying political and social realities. There was impressive
economic growth in Venezuela in the 1950s to the late 1970s, but
under the country’s oligarchic two-party system, the gains were
not widely distributed.238 According to Edwin Williamson, “oilwealth became concentrated in the upper echelons, while poverty
shot up to 50 percent in the 1980s from about 15 percent in the

Samra, supra note 6, at 90.
Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 29; id. at 20
(regarding Dec. 1992 central bank reform); id. at 22 (providing inflation statistics).
234 Id. at 20. See also Gutiérrez, supra note 110, at 16 (reporting annual inflation in
Venezuela of 13% in 1980–1984, 33% in 1985–1989, 41% in 1990–1994, and 53% in 1995–
1999).
235 Recall that Jácome excluded Venezuela and Argentina from his analysis that
purports to correlate central bank independence with low inflation in the 1990s, perhaps
because the empirical evidence would only undermine Jácome’s thesis as well. See
Jácome, Legal Central Bank Independence, supra note 58, at 23–24.
236 Id. at 20–22.
237 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 594.
238 Id. at 593 (reporting that Venezuela’s economy grew about 6% per year from about
1950 to the late 1970s).
232
233
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1950s.”239 A report of the Inter-American Dialogue that was
critical of Chávez, conceded that “during the 1980s and 1990s, no
South American country deteriorated more than Venezuela; its
gross domestic product (GDP) fell some 40 percent.”240 In 1989,
after imposing the standard International Monetary Fund
austerity program, the capital of Caracas exploded in rioting and
looting which spread to other cities, the army was called in, and
several hundred civilians were killed in the repression.241 In
1994, the country’s banking system collapsed and there were
massive strikes against austerity measures.242
This all occurred during the period of relative central bank
independence, but none of this chaos appears in any of the
autistic economics literature. It also explains the populism and
popularity of Chávez when he was elected with 56% of the vote in
1998.243 As Williamson concluded, “The programme of reform
undertaken by Chávez has to be understood as a reaction to what
young army officers like him regarded as a hopelessly corrupt
oligarchy which had squandered the nation’s huge oil resources
while doing too little for the poor and disadvantaged.”244
At the time Chávez assumed power in 1998, Venezuela’s
poverty rate was 52%;245 by 2007, the poverty rate had fallen to
27.5%, and there were declines in measures of income inequality
as well.246 According to Mark Weisbrot, this impressive reduction in poverty, which was largely overlooked by the
mainstream media in the United States, resulted from higher
economic growth rates and significant government spending to
increase people’s access to health care, education, and
nutrition.247
One need not support Hugo Chávez’s style of politics or his
foreign policy agenda to see the wisdom in reforming a central

Id. at 594.
MICHAEL SHIFTER, HUGO CHÁVEZ: A TEST FOR U.S. POLICY, A SPECIAL REPORT OF
THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE 11 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.thedialogue.org/
PublicationFiles/Hugo%20Ch%C3%A1vez%20-%20A%20Test%20for%20U.S.%20Policy%
20%28pdf%29.pdf.
241 WILLAMSON, supra note 122, at 594.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 WORLD BANK, supra note 220, at 65 tbl.2.7.
246 Mark Weisbrot, Poverty Reduction in Venezuela: A Reality-Based View, REVISTA:
HARV. REV. LATIN AM., Fall 2008, at 36, 39 (reporting decline in income inequality in
Venezuela as measured by the Gini coefficient).
247 Id. at 36, 38–39 (reporting that publications such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Policy, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Financial Times, and the Miami
Herald and many others had published articles “falsely asserting that poverty had
increased under the Chavez government”).
239
240

Do Not Delete

2011]

3/17/2011 12:20 AM

Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight

281

bank to make it more accountable to a wider range of societal
interests than those of a narrow banking fraternity.
In
December 2007, Chávez proposed a series of reforms that
included restricting the central bank’s independence by vesting
ultimate monetary authority in the Executive,248 quite different
from the United States and many other countries where ultimate
authority is vested in the legislative branch even if the
legislature has delegated that power to an independent central
bank for the time being.249 It is also different from the 1940s
period of central banking in the United States where policy was
directed by the White House and Treasury which were subject to
checks and balances by an independent judiciary and legislative
branch.250 But such distinctions are apparently lost on Samra
who uses Chávez as a straw man to attack any criticism of
central bank independence. The false dichotomy is taken to an
absurd extreme when Samra raises the specter of Robert Mugabe
in Zimbabwe.251 Apparently any move toward central bank
accountability, according to Samra’s logic, is a step toward
hyperinflation, ruthless dictatorship, and mob violence.
Perhaps Samra is correct to be concerned about vesting such
powers in Hugo Chávez, but his misgivings seem to have less to
do with concerns about the political accountability of the Chávez
government and much more to do with its social and populist
objectives. For instance, Samra criticizes the proposed reform for
seeking to turn the central bank into an agent for funding “vast
social programs” and domestic development objectives.252 He
declares, “A central bank that transforms into a development and
relief agency has ceased to be a central bank.”253 This, he
considers, would be “fundamental madness.”254
Perhaps Samra would dismiss the Federal Reserve’s strict
accountability during the 1940s as nothing more than “a slush
fund” for Franklin Roosevelt’s “regional, political, and military
ambitions, not to mention his domestic development goals.”255
248 Chris Kraul, Venezuelan Voters Reject Bid by Chavez to Extend Powers, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A1.
249 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2,
at 1.
250 Id. at 101–04.
For instance, Samra criticizes the proposed 2007 reform for
attempting to require the Venezuelan central bank to follow the policy direction of the
elected government, not unlike in the 1940s when the Federal Reserve followed the lead
of the White House and Treasury. Samra, supra note 6, at 92–94.
251 Samra, supra note 6, at 65 (quoting Felipe Larrain’s warnings about
hyperinflation being awakened by leaders such as Chavez and Mugabe).
252 Id. at 94.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
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But for the millions of people in the United States and abroad
who sought freedom and security, those ambitions and goals were
theirs as well. Should we consider it “madness” to have a central
bank support programs like the G.I. Bill of Rights, the Marshall
Plan, or childhood education and nutrition, but somehow
consider it acceptable when a central bank provides trillions of
dollars in support for commercial banks and hedge funds? Such
a perspective may seem upside-down to all but well-heeled
lawyers and economists representing large banks and other
financial interests. The reality is that since the 2008 financial
crisis, the Federal Reserve has transformed itself into a relief
agency for powerful banks and wealthy investors. This should
suggest that the central bank has ceased to be a central bank for
anyone but an elite financial oligarchy. Therein lies the fundamental madness of our current troubles.
E. Farewell to Legal Autism
All four of the case studies offered by Samra are examples of
“legal autism”—descriptions of legal rules without any reference
to social settings or historical contexts, and without any
correlation to changes in actual economic performance.256 It is a
strange ending to an argument that relies elsewhere on empirical
evidence of a purported relationship between central bank
independence and low inflation. Although Samra makes the bold
assertion that the results of these studies are “quite striking” and
“clearly argue in favor of greater independence,” they are mainly
striking in their flaws.257 In fact, in reading these studies one
would have no idea that there had been tremendous economic
growth and low inflation from the 1940s through the 1960s in
much of the world in the absence of independent central
banking;258 that a global oil cartel had quadrupled the price of oil
in the early 1970s, and then doubled the price at the end of that
decade;259 that there had been debt crises and currency
contagions throughout Latin America and much of the developing
world over the past three decades;260 that China has risen as an
economic power without the help of an independent central
Id. at 82–93
Id. at 73.
CHANG, supra note 169, at 27–31; HAHNEL, supra note 175, at 7; BRETTON WOODS
COMM’N, BRETTON WOODS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, COMMISSION REPORT (1994);
Average
Annual
Inflation Rates
by
Decade,
INFLATIONDATA.COM
(2008),
http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/images/charts/articles/decadeinflation.jpg.
259 Andrew Brod, Look Back at 1970s to Understand a Real Energy Crisis, NEWSRECORD.COM,
http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/A_Brod_LookBackat1970_2001.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 11, 2011).
260 Kristin J. Forbes & Roberto Rigobon, Contagion in Latin America: Definitions,
Measurement, and Policy Implications, ECONOMIA, Spring 2001, at 1, 1–2.
256
257
258

Do Not Delete

2011]

3/17/2011 12:20 AM

Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight

283

bank;261 and that 2008 brought a tremendous crisis in global
financial markets and the most severe economic downturn in
many countries since the Great Depression.262
These are rather astounding omissions. At a time when
mainstream economics has been criticized and discredited for
failing to predict or prevent the tremendous hyperinflation of
asset prices and the most damaging financial crisis in more than
eighty years, apologists of central bank independence continue to
overlook any empirical evidence and historical facts that would
undermine their normative conclusions. Since the crash, the
Federal Reserve has poured trillions of dollars into its private
sector banking clientele; a colossal monetary version of porkbarrel spending.263 None of this is even mentioned by Samra. It
is an impressive display of myopia and studied ignorance. There
is no justification offered for the limited scope of analysis and no
recognition that perhaps the very broad conclusions of these
studies should therefore be tempered.
III. THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGFUL DEBATE
The regime of independent central banking has contributed
significantly to a financial and economic crisis of historic
proportions. Its supporters, however, have shown little to no
responsibility for their actions. In fact, the independence of the
leading central banks, particularly the Federal Reserve and the
European Central Bank, have been instrumental in fashioning
the hidden bailouts that continue to subsidize the profits and
bonuses of big banks and hedge funds.264 The obvious culpability
of central bankers warrants some degree of humility and
introspection by supporters of central bank independence.
It is a sign of the weakness of the case for central bank
autonomy that some of its proponents would choose to engage in
“ad hominem” attacks on those who support increased
accountability.265 Samra’s article engages in an unfortunate level
261 See generally ZULIU HU & MOHSIN S. KHAN, WHY IS CHINA GROWING SO FAST?,
ECONOMIC ISSUES 8 (1997).
262 Heather Stewart, We Are in the Worst Financial Crisis Since Depression, Says
IMF, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2008, at A28.
263 James Quinn, Audit of Fed Will Reveal Name of Banks Given $2 Trillion in Loans,
THE TELEGRAPH (May 12, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
newsbysector/banksandfinance/7713041/Audit-of-federal-reserve-will-reveal-name-ofbanks-given-2-trillion-in-loans.html.
264 Jack Ewing & Julia Werdigier, Europe’s Central Bank Extends Cash Lifeline and
Gives Regulators a Pep Talk, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at B3 (reporting European
Central Bank purchases of 40.5 billion euros ($49.1 billion) in bonds on the open market
while failing to disclose what kinds of bonds).
265 An ad hominem argument seeks to link the validity of a premise to a
characteristic of the person advocating the premise by appealing to feelings or prejudices
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of ad hominem argumentation directly in response to my critique
of central bank autonomy and my view that the Washington
Consensus policy agenda was resulting in widening inequalities
in income, wealth, and power that were empirically
measureable.266 Those inequalities have become too large to
ignore, which is why ad hominem arguments, by attacking the
messenger, are intended on some level to discredit the messenger
and shock the discussion back in another direction, deflecting
discussion away from social inequality and structural injustices.
Nowhere does Samra actually refute the empirical evidence
that the trend toward central bank independence has coincided
with stagnant real wages, higher real interest rates, and
increasing inequalities in income, wealth, and power. Instead,
Samra engages in a fair amount of breathless name-calling while
conflating my argument with the views of Latin American
populists and dictators, past and present. He does this through
the use of the ad hominem “perfect idiot” which he claims is the
insight of a “groundbreaking study of Latin American populism”
entitled Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot, itself one long
ad hominem attack of name-calling and guilt-by-association
against anyone who has ever offered a critical history of Latin
America or U.S. foreign policy or called for redressing the
enormous inequalities in income, wealth, and power through the
agencies of the state.267
Although the co-authors of The Perfect Idiot, like Samra,
never define their terms, it is instructive to do so. “Idiot” is
considered “usually offensive” and is used to describe “a person
affected with extreme mental retardation,” “a foolish or stupid
person,” and is derived from the Greek idiōtēs to mean a
“layman” or “ignorant person.”268 The use of this insult by Samra
and The Perfect Idiot authors, after having ignored all contrary
factual evidence (all the black swans and all the black elephants
rather than intellect;; it is marked by “an attack on an opponent's character rather than by
an answer to the contentions made.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 15
(11th ed. 2004). In this case, the premise is that independent central banks undermine
social welfare. Samra’s ad hominem attacks seek to undermine that premise by namecalling and guilt-by-association tactics.
266 Samra, supra note 6, at 74–75 (quoting from Canova, Financial Liberalization,
supra note 28, at 1294, 1301–04). Samra’s article is filled with breathless exclamations of
“terrifying” and “ominous warnings” of hyperinflation and ruthless dictatorships that are
to be associated with making central banks more accountable to elected governments.
Samra, supra note 6, at 65. Perhaps in the future he will develop the “mental courage” to
re-think his mode of arguments, underlying assumptions and world view. David Brooks, A
Case of Mental Courage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at A23 (decrying the underlying
“metacognition deficit” that habitually afflicts this generation and prevents people from
stepping back to re-think their positions and weaknesses).
267 Id. at 75.
268 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 265 (emphasis added).
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in plain sight), is a bit like the pot calling the kettle black.
Perhaps “glutton” would be an equally apt term to describe the
mind-set of the authors of The Perfect Idiot.269 The vast and
growing inequalities in wealth and income, along with enormous
central bank subsidies to a financial oligarchy, are suggestive of
an upper-class elite that is prone to gluttony. Perhaps “the
perfect glutton” is one who will swallow any shallow or specious
argument, including ignorant empirical studies, all in the
interests of amassing more riches beyond that which can ever be
consumed in a lifetime. But it is a gluttony that is concealed in
high-minded pretensions to cosmopolitanism and economic
sophistication.
Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot is a book written
by three ideological right-wing Latin American journalists, a
book with no index, no sources, and a lot of name-calling.270 It is
not the work of scholarship and it does not belong in a serious
scholarly article on central bank accountability. Its misuse by
Samra is worthy of a response, but before discussing the parts of
this book misused by Samra, it is instructive to consider the
general tenor of the book and its ideological biases. Although
The Perfect Idiot co-authors seek to place their work within the
tradition of satire, it is difficult to imagine Sartre,271 Camus,272 or
Revel273 flinging ad hominem insults at their adversaries and
then pretending it is to seek “intellectual confrontation in the
arena of ideas, not anecdotes, using arguments, not insults or
personal attacks.”274 If calling one’s adversaries names like
“idiots” is not an insult, then the level of discourse has surely
fallen to a new low. If it is genuinely an attempt at satire, then
for all three The Perfect Idiot co-authors their laugh is truly
louder than their humor.275
269 Glutton is defined as “one given habitually to greedy and voracious eating and
drinking,” one possessing a voracious appetite that endures and is never satiated. Id. Its
synonyms include gorger, hog, overeater, pig, and stuffer. The word is derived from the
Latin gluttire, “to swallow.” Glutton, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/glutton (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
270 Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza is a Columbian novelist; Carlos Alberto Montaner is a
Cuban essayist and journalist; Alvaro Vargas Llosa is a Peruvian columnist. MENDOZA,
MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 219.
271 See generally JEAN PAUL SARTRE, http://www.sartre.org (last visited Jan. 11,
2011).
272 See generally The Nobel Prize in Literature 1957 Albert Camus, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
(Jan. 11, 2011), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1957/camusbio.html.
273 See generally Jean-Francois Revel, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1221191/Jean-Francois-Revel.
274 Mario Vargas Llosa, Introduction to MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA,
supra note 19, at xvi.
275 The Perfect Idiot book lacks empirical support and rigor; there is no serious index
or list of references, and no attempt to discuss ideas without name-calling. There is a
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The book begins with an attack on Eduardo Galeano’s truly
groundbreaking 1970 book, Open Veins of Latin America which
The Perfect Idiot trio crudely denounces as the idiot’s Bible.276
They attack Galeano, just as Samra attacks my work, for use of
“the old dichotomy” of left versus right, the use of the word
“neoliberal” to describe the Washington Consensus agenda, and
the use of class to analyze the effects of that policy agenda on
Latin American societies.277 According to Michael Davis and
Dana Neacsu, “one of the hegemonic and legitimizing features of
globalization is the exclusion of parts of the debate as unworthy,
in fact foreclosing what might be the most meaningful parts of
the debate as meaningless.”278 Apparently, The Perfect Idiot trio
would foreclose any class analysis as meaningless and any
discussion of political polarization and a neoliberal agenda as old
thinking. Perhaps in 1996, in the “irrational exuberance” of the
expanding bubble economy, when The Perfect Idiot was first
published, it may have seemed that such discussions could be
excluded as unworthy and meaningless. In the aftermath of the
bubble, as it continues to deflate for millions around the world,
class analysis and critiques of the neoliberal agenda and
criticism of unaccountable central bankers may well be the most
meaningful parts of debate.
The Perfect Idiot trio attack Galeano for his use of the “open
veins” metaphor and his view that the underdevelopment of poor
countries is historically the result of the enrichment of others.279
They take exception with Galeano’s statement that “Everything,
from the discovery until our times, has always been transmuted
into European—or later United States—capital, and as such has
accumulated in distant centers of power.”280 Perhaps the trio
compendium of quotations entitled “Index Expurgatorius Latinoamericanus” which
denigrates a list of people and organizations that includes Raul Alfonsin (the former
president of Argentina who helped defeat a military dictatorship), Amnesty International
(for its conclusion that market reforms “have exacerbated social tensions” in Colombia),
and Brazilian president Lula Da Silva (for a statement against privatizing state-owned
companies and asserting the state has an important and dominant role). Id. at 209–18.
Just to make sure all of these speakers are discredited by association, this “Index
Expurgatorius Latinoamericanus” also includes Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, and it
begins with an unattributed quotation: “It isn’t having been an idiot that’s so bad but
persisting to be one.” Id.
276 Id. at 21. See generally EDUARDO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE
CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT (1973).
277 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 66–69; Samra, supra
note 6, at 74–75.
278 Michael Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free
Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political Economy, 69
UMKC L. REV. 733, 734 (2001).
279 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 25 (quoting GALEANO,
supra note 276, at 11).
280 GALEANO, supra note 276, at 12.
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should consider the views of Adam Smith, the grandfather of
free-market economics whom they would likely claim as their
ideological ancestor and soul mate.
Smith wrote of the
consequences of the Old World “discovery” of Latin America: “The
pious purpose of [Spain] converting them to Christianity
sanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of finding
treasures of gold there was the sole motive which prompted
[Spain] to undertake it.”281 The vast riches of gold and silver
taken by Spain from the New World were “of a nature to excite in
human avidity the most extravagant expectation of still greater
riches.”282
The Perfect Idiot trio scorn all non-monetarist views of
inflation, which, as discussed above, only serves to show their
own ignorance.283 Likewise, they ridicule the idea of declining
terms of trade and structural inequalities in political and market
power, and instead hold fast to simplistic assumptions of armslength bargaining between equals.284
They ignore serious
critiques of the global trading system offered by leading Latin
American economists and they distort the history of the foreign
debt crisis by characterizing bank loans of petrodollars at high
interest rates as gifts.285 They denigrate the idea that division of
labor and trade results in winners and losers, an axiom of free
trade theory and empirical reality itself.286 But for all their
ridicule and ignorance, there is not any serious analysis, only
conclusory arguments that show serious ideological biases.
For instance, their ideological blinders are apparent in their
discussion of Chile, where they claimed the vast majority of
citizens support the creation of a private pension and health care
system. “Only a perfect idiot,” they claim, “would think of

281 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 72 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976).
282 Id. at 78.
283 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 24–44.
284 Id. at 44 (equating criticisms of declining terms of trade with complaints about
natural injustices such as the color of the sky).
285 Id. at 54.
286 Id. at 23. See also Eli Heckscher, The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution
of Income, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 272, 272 (Howard S.
Ellis & Lloyd A. Metzler eds., 1949) (introducing the Heckscher-Ohlin model); PAUL R.
KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 72
(2006); MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 378–83 (3d
ed. 1985) (discussing Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin trade theories in context of growth
in less developed countries); STEVEN M. SURANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND
POLICY 134 (2010) (discussing distributive effects of trade and the compensation principle
by which winners of free trade should compensate lowers to benefit of all); JOHN
WILLIAMSON, THE OPEN ECONOMY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 42–43 (1983) (discussing
comparative advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin model); Elizabeth Becker, U.N. Study
Finds Global Trade Benefits Are Uneven, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at C5.
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returning to a government-run pension system” that would
consume money, expand the bureaucracy, and create a jungle of
middlemen to administer such a program.287 Instead, there has
been a jungle of private insurance company middle men, a huge
private bureaucracy siphoning the savings of millions in the form
of hefty commissions and administrative fees, not unlike the
private health insurance bureaucracy found in the United States.
In a 2004 World Bank study, empirical analysis of two decades of
Chile’s pension system showed that “more than half of all
workers [are excluded] from even a semblance of a safety net
during their old age.”288 Investment accounts of retirees were so
low that forty-one percent of those eligible to receive pensions
were forced to continue working and the government was forced
to provide subsidies for those failing to accumulate enough
money in their pension accounts to pay basic old age expenses in
retirement.289 When the huge commissions and other
administrative costs were taken into consideration, the total
average return on worker contributions between 1982 and 1999
was 5.1%, less than half of what had been calculated by the
superintendency of pension funds.290 The average worker would
have done better by simply placing their pension contributions in
a passbook savings account.291
Chile’s privatized pension scheme was good business for
private investment firms but it failed to provide for many
retirees, thereby contributing to Chile’s high poverty rate.
Retirees would have received higher annuities “if the system had
remained in government hands.”292 Recall The Perfect Idiot trio’s
conclusion that “only a perfect idiot would think of returning to a
government-run pension system.”293 In fact, Chileans were
forced to re-think the country’s privatized pension system and to
cough up government subsidies to supplement the program.294

MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 72.
GREG ANRIG, THE CONSERVATIVES HAVE NO CLOTHES: WHY RIGHT-WING IDEAS
KEEP FAILING 206 (2004) (quoting a 2004 World Bank report). See INDERMIT S. GILL,
TRUMAN G. PACKARD & JUAN YERMO, KEEPING THE PROMISE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN
LATIN AMERICA xvii (2004).
289 Greg Anrig & Bernard Wasow, Twelve Reasons Why Privatizing Social Security is
a Bad Idea, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION (Dec. 13, 2004), http://tcf.org/publications/2004/
12/pb503.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 GRANDIN, supra note 112, at 203 (citing to Larry Rohter, Chile’s Retirees Find
Shortfall in Private Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A1).
293 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 72.
294 Larry Rohter, Chile’s Candidates Agree to Agree on Pension Woes, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2006, at A3 (quoting Patricio Navia, a political science professor, that most
Chileans “perceive the costs of pensions and the pensions themselves as unfair” and as
287
288
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In the 2006 presidential election, Sebastián Piñera, the
billionaire businessman and conservative candidate, agreed that
the privatized pension system was in need of repair.295 He noted
that half of Chileans had no pension coverage and of those who
did, 40% were not receiving the minimum level.296 This was a
rather embarrassing admission since the candidate’s brother,
José Piñera, was “the former labor minister who imposed the
personal account system” during the Pinochet dictatorship and
since Sebastián Piñera was “backed by the large business groups
that control the pension funds and have benefited from the
expansion of investment capital the funds have provided.”297
How ironic for the conservative candidate, and brother of the
architect of pension privatization, to propose a government
“guaranteed pension for housewives,” “matching government
contributions” for the poor, and “more bargaining power for
consumers.”298 The only idiocy is that anyone would be surprised
that a privatized pension system could possibly result in huge
profits for private pension fund managers and inadequate
returns for most Chileans. But it is important to recall that the
private pension scheme was put in place during a period of
military dictatorship when labor unions and civil society lacked
basic democratic freedoms, large business interests enjoyed
favored access to government, and the polity was essentially
shocked, murdered, and tortured into submission.
Throughout their book, The Perfect Idiot co-authors are the
perfect apologists for violent dictatorships and coup d’états
against elected governments and civil society, including any coup
sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or big
business interests. For a book that purports to disdain the
political divisions between left and right, the trio is silent on
the crimes of the right. They attack Augusto Sandino, the
Nicaraguan revolutionary who rebelled against U.S. occupation
of his country,299 but not a word of condemnation for Anastasio
resenting the huge overhead costs “that have led to record profits for the pension funds
that manage the contributions”).
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. Apparently, proposing government guaranteed pensions and other such public
interventions was not bad politics. Although he lost his campaign in 2006, Sebastián
Piñera was ultimately elected president of Chile in January 2010. Times Topics:
Sebastián Piñera, NYTIMES.COM, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
people/p/sebastian_pinera/index.html (last updated Oct. 13, 2010) (reporting that in his
2010 campaign, Mr. Piñera “promised to carry on many of the social programs put in
place by President Michelle Bachelet, whose approval ratings have hovered around 75
percent”).
299 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 152.
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Samoza, the brutal Nicaraguan dictator who served U.S.
geopolitical and corporate interests.300 They condemn Jacobo
Árbenz Guzmán, the reformist and duly-elected president of
Guatemala who was overthrown in a CIA-financed coup in 1954
to shield the United Fruit Company from any land reform.301
They vilify Salvador Allende, the democratically-elected
president of Chile violently overthrown on September 11, 1973,
in another CIA-sponsored and corporate-financed coup that
installed Augusto Pinochet in a brutal dictatorship.302 They
scorn Cuba’s Marxist dictator Fidel Castro but go easy on what
came before Castro, the corrupt and repressive regime of
Fulgencio Batista, who was in bed with organized crime.303
Such partisanship is shameful for journalists as well as
would-be scholars. Camus reminded the writers of his day to
aspire to bear witness for those who are enslaved and he rejected
apologists for repression who were angered at the murder of a
man only when that man shared their ideas.304
Camus
understood that the brutal repressions in the East bloc did not
excuse the sins of the West.
Not only is the trio’s disdain for democracy and human
rights morally reprehensible, it is also self-defeating to long-term
interests of peace and stability. As Edwin Williamson concluded,
“It was the toppling of Árbenz that had alienated young radicals
throughout Latin America, persuading them of the need for
armed struggle.”305
The record of past U.S. support for
repression and brutality in Latin America lives on in our present

300 See generally WILLIAM KREHM, DEMOCRACIES AND TYRANNIES OF THE CARIBBEAN
(1984) [hereinafter KREHM, DEMOCRACIES AND TYRANNIES].
301 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 323, 353 (discussing involvement of CIA and
United Fruit). See generally DEMOCRACIES AND TYRANNIES, supra note 300. The Perfect
Idiot trio claim that the 1954 CIA coup against President Árbenz in Guatemala was not to
help United Fruit but was inspired by Árbenz’ purchase of Czech weapons and his
purported strong ties to communism. MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note
19, at 139. They offer no real support for such conclusions and their guilt-by-association
indictment of Árbenz is reminiscent of the Red Scare of the McCarthy period at the time
of the coup.
302 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 209, 352; WILLIAMSON,
supra note 122, at 67. See also NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF
DISASTER CAPITALISM 99–100 (2007); PETER KORNBLUH, THE PINOCHET FILE: A
DECLASSIFIED DOSSIER ON ATROCITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 105 (2003).
303 MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 209, 181; WILLIAMSON,
supra note 122, at 443–44.
304 ALBERT CAMUS, Why Spain?, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 75, 83
(Justin O’Brien trans., 1960) (replying to a December 1948 publication by Gabriel Marcel
in COMBAT).
305 WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 588 (reporting that the CIA’s overthrow of Árbenz
“was the decisive factor in Che Guevara’s decision to join Fidel Castro’s insurgency in
Cuba in 1956”).
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day, giving credence to conspiracy theories306 and complicating
U.S. efforts to build strong alliances in the region.307
But perhaps peace and stability, like democracy and human
rights, are not the real objectives of many of those who defend
the prerogatives of central bankers. In The Shock Doctrine,
Naomi Klein exposed the right-wing strategy to consciously
exploit crises to push through market reforms—“shock
therapy”—that would never happen in less frightening times.308
The crises could be actual or perceived, unexpected or
intentional, from a natural disaster to a violent coup d’état.309
The mode of argument deployed in The Perfect Idiot also
lives on and seems to be gaining strength in our political and
popular and academic cultures. Ad hominem attacks have
become standard fare in our public debates. Like The Perfect
Idiot trio who vilify anyone who speaks up for social rights and
economic justice, Glenn Beck, the right-wing Fox-TV talk show
host, has equated Christian churches working for “social justice”
with Nazism and Communism.310 Samra and The Perfect Idiot
trio invoke Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro time and again to
smear scholars and substantive arguments completely
unconnected to Chávez or Castro. Likewise, Sarah Palin, the
former vice presidential candidate, has used the same McCarthyera style guilt-by-association tactics to attack the recent U.S.
health care reform by invoking Fidel Castro, as if the fact that
306 Chavez Accuses CIA as Bombings Rock Venezuela, TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at 7,
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/08/2003070877.
307 For instance, revelations that General Pinochet amassed a fortune of $28 million
while in power, perhaps in part from manufacturing and smuggling cocaine, undermines
U.S. efforts to build alliances in the region. Larry Rohter, Former Aide Says Pinochet and
a Son Dealt in Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at A3. The person who defeated
Sebastián Piñero in Chile’s 2005 presidential election was Michelle Bachelet, “a member
of Allende’s Socialist Party who had been exiled for a time in East Germany.”
WILLIAMSON, supra note 122, at 579.
308 KLEIN, supra note 302, at 7–8, 11–13.
309 Id. at 174–75, 230–31, 290–91, 320 (showing various examples of how certain
crises have elicited the same policy responses as characterized by “shock therapy”). Of
course, crisis has also had the effect of moving policy to the left;; Roosevelt’s New Deal was
made possible by the massive hardships and dislocations of the Great Depression.
However, right-wing governments seem more adept at creating and engineering crises,
when not through violent coups then by gross mismanagement and looting of the
economy. J. Lawrence Broz, Partisan Financial Cycles (draft dated April 18, 2010),
available at http://cpe.ucsd.edu/assets/006/11488.pdf (finding “that governments in power
prior to major financial crises are more likely than the average OECD country to be rightof-center in political orientation” and “more likely to be associated with policies that
predict crises: large fiscal and current account deficits, heavy borrowing from abroad, and
lax bank regulation”).
310 Hanna Siegel, Christians Rip Glenn Beck over ‘Social Justice’ Slam: Right-Wing
Host Conflates Christian ‘Social Justice’ With Nazism, Communism, ABC NEWS (Mar. 12,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/glenn-beck-social-justice-christians-rage-back-nazism/
story?id=10085008.
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Castro once said something positive about the reform has any
bearing on its substantive merits or flaws.311 These kinds of
mindless hit-and-run attacks are lamentable in political
discourse, and more so in scholarly discussion.
As for Samra’s use of The Perfect Idiot in his defense of
central bank independence, he attacks class-based critiques of
the Washington Consensus model as ubiquitous, the “old
dichotomy of the left against the right,” semantic, emotional,
frenzied, repetitive, Marxist Vulgate, and likened them to the
Inquisition against Middle Age heresies.312 That is an awful lot
of name-calling to avoid a response on the substantive merits as
to whether or not the Washington Consensus policy agenda is
actually correlated to top heavy distributions of wealth and
income, increased poverty levels, and diminished security. As
discussed above, all of these distributional consequences are
empirically verifiable, and it is precisely because these
consequences have in fact been empirically verified313 that Samra
must engage in this distasteful name-calling.
Samra also apparently considers the use of the word
“neoliberalism” to be an appeal to populist prejudices, an
anathema that radical leftists attempt to lodge into the public
conscience.314 As a former legislative aide to the late U.S.
Senator Paul Tsongas who was a leader in what was often
referred to in the 1980s as a neoliberal movement within the
Democratic Party,315 I have witnessed the evolution of the term
“neoliberal” from Tsongas’s moderate liberalism to a more
aggressive libertarian economic agenda that seeks a fantasy
state in economic relations (“there’s no government like no
government”) where owners of capital enjoy a world of rights
without duties.316 If repeating the “neoliberalism” word has some
mesmerizing effect on the public conscience, perhaps all the more

311 Michael Muskal, Ex-running Mates Reunite, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at A18
(reporting Sarah Palin’s statement that “When it comes to Obamacare[,] . . . I see Fidel
Castro likes Obamacare and we don’t. Doesn’t that tell you something?”).
312 Samra, supra note 6, at 75.
Perhaps Samra should also consult with The
Federalist Papers which recognized the existence of social and class divisions, including
along the line of creditor and debtor factions. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 54–55 (James
Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898).
313 See supra notes 264–267, 312 and accompanying text.
314 Samra, supra note 6, at 75.
315 Even in the hands of Senator Tsongas, who held many traditional liberal values
and supported many social welfare programs, the short-lived “Neoliberal” movement
showed a disturbing indulgence for economic orthodoxy and financial deregulation. PAUL
TSONGAS, THE ROAD FROM HERE: LIBERALISM AND REALITIES IN THE 1980S, at xii–xv
(1981).
316 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 66, 69 (2005).
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reason to invoke it.317 At any rate, in more recent years,
“neoliberalism” seems to have been replaced with the terms
“Washington Consensus” and “market fundamentalism.” All
three of these terms are basically efficient short-hand for the
same policy agenda that has been promoted by the International
Monetary Fund, the U.S. Treasury, Wall Street interests, and
other leading G-8 institutions: deregulation, trade liberalization,
financial liberalization, privatization, fiscal austerity, and central
bank independence.318
Is it politically incorrect to use words and phrases such as
“neoliberalism,” “Washington Consensus,” and “market
fundamentalism;” and how about the word “autism” to describe
the abstract unreality of mainstream economics? Perhaps these
too will be dismissed by Samra as the idiot’s attempts to rouse
the rabble through frenzied repetition. Samra’s diatribe against
terminology seems eerily reminiscent of right-wing thought
police and left-wing guardians of political correctness.319 The
point of such name-calling, however, is to prevent any
substantive discussion from moving forward about poverty rates,
social insecurity, and distributions of wealth and income.
Samra continues his ad hominem attack by quoting from The
Perfect Idiot trio that anyone is an idiot who believes that
monetary issuance as a way of reactivating demand and making
up for the shortage of resources “is also a means not only of
development but of what he defines, with grandiloquent
pomposity, as social investment.”320 Apparently, Samra would
consider Abraham Lincoln to have been an idiot for signing the
Legal Tender Acts that created nearly $450 million of U.S. Notes
(a rather large sum in the 1860s), considered by many a financial
necessity to finance the North’s military effort in the Civil

317 Perhaps Samra sees “neoliberalism” as having the same kind of mesmerizing
effect on populist movements that phrases like “freedom of contract” and “property rights”
have on the leaders at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The
latter terms, however, like “free trade” itself, embody a system of institutional doublestandards. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical
Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 67, 68 n.12 (2006).
318 KLEIN, supra note 302, at 204.
319 Of course, words like “left” and “right” and “center” are short-hand terms that are
useful to move the discussion forward, efficient ways of describing relatively coherent
political orientations characterized by lesser or greater degrees of support for economic
regulation, social policy, military intervention, and a host of other policies. Perhaps
Samra knows of some other way of describing such political orientations, but more likely
his criticism of these terms is intended to simply prevent any critical discussion from
taking place at all.
320 Samra, supra note 6, at 75 (quoting MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA,
supra note 19, at 69).
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War.321 But rather than discuss the many historical periods
when currency issuance was used successfully to activate
demand, activate supply, and spur economic development,322 it is
so much more convenient for Samra to quickly raise the specter
again of Hugo Chávez whom he claims has been “‘catastrophic’
for the region.”323 Does Samra offer any empirical evidence of the
catastrophe resulting from Chávez’s monetary policies? No. He
offers no discussion or acknowledge-ment of the empirical
evidence showing a decline in poverty and more equitable
distributions of income under Chávez. Instead, his only support
for “the Chávez catastrophe” comes from The Perfect Idiot coauthors, the three Latin American journalists who lack any
economic training or scholarly pretense.324
There is a final ad hominem attack that Samra offers
against my own work: “[G]iven the collective Latin American
experience over the last half-century, what is perhaps most
striking about the sorts of arguments advanced by Professor
Canova is their dogged persistence.”325 Recall that the reader is
never provided with any empirical support to ascertain any
collective Latin American experience over the last half century
other than the flawed empirical studies that purport to correlate
central bank independence with low inflation, and the very nonempirical conclusions of The Perfect Idiot co-authors and several
other ideologues. Regardless, Samra contrasts my purported
stridency (and dogged stridency at that326) with the “more

321 See Timothy A. Canova, Lincoln’s Populist Sovereignty: Public Finance Of, By, and
For the People, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 561, 565–66 (2009).
322 Id. at 569–74.
323 Samra, supra note 6, at 75.
324 Id. at 75 n.75 (citing MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at
69). The Perfect Idiot trio also denounce John Maynard Keynes for providing the
intellectual support for a mixed economy, government planning and intervention, and
“monetary issuance as a way of reactivating demand and making up for the shortage of
resources.” MENDOZA, MONTANER, & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 19, at 69. They also
denounce the British welfare state as perfect idiocy that “has in fact generated
catastrophic policies” in Latin America. Id. Nowhere is there any balanced discussion,
nowhere any critical consideration of the empirical evidence. Instead, it is the same
name-calling, guilt-by-association, and cartoonish condemnations. What a contrast to a
thoughtful conservative like Judge Richard Posner who is not afraid to re-think his views
in light of changing circumstances, empirical evidence, and theoretical inquiry. Richard A.
Posner, How I Became a Keynesian, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 23, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/how-i-became-keynesian (conceding his conversion to
Keynesian economics was prompted by reading Keynes’s The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money for the first time).
325 Samra, supra note 6, at 76.
326 Id. at 65, 70–76. Apparently, according to Samra, populists are to be considered
doggedly persistent, strident, grandiloquent, pompous, single-minded, frenzied, and
fixated on immediate short-term results, while libertarian-conservatives are considered
principled, consistent, forceful, even-keeled, wise, and concerned about long-term
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cautious note” expressed by Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve
chairman, that political elites and the broader public in Latin
America should favor fiscal discipline, tree trade, and free
markets.327 This statement by Bernanke was made in 2005, at a
time when he was promoting freedom for large financial
institutions to do as they pleased in the subprime mortgage
market, the market for securitized assets, and the market for
derivative financial instruments. Of course, as many predicted,
that experiment in deregulation ended badly.
Since then, Gentle Ben has been particularly gentle to his
Wall Street clientele while preaching fiscal discipline for the
middle class. He has supported extension of the Bush tax cuts
for the wealthiest one percent of U.S. households, and he has
used the Federal Reserve’s power to create money on a grand
scale, opening the monetary spigots to quench the thirst of a
rather narrow constituency, a Wall Street cartel that has become
increasingly out of touch with Main Street.328
For all of Samra’s sound and fury and name-calling, he is
correct about one thing. Those who advocate for accountability in
central banking and for renewed economic democracy are indeed
persistent.
Aspirations for justice and economic freedom,
including freedom from want and freedom from fear, are
perennial. The recent efforts in Congress to reform the Federal
Reserve suggest that this persistence is making slow but steady
progress.
IV. PERSISTENCE OF REFORM: CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Conservative jurists and legal scholars routinely criticize the
modern administrative state for overly broad delegations of
lawmaking power from Congress to bureaucratic agencies.329

results—even as he engages in his breathless “ominous warnings” of “terrifying”
consequences and impending doom.
327 Id. at 76.
328 Perhaps Samra and other gatekeepers of discourse will take exception to the use
of the term “Main Street” as another false dichotomy between those who have plenty
(Wall Street) and those who have less (the middle and lower classes), and as an “old
scholastic stratagem” to vilify anyone who disagrees by lodging another anathema “into
the public conscience through frenzied repetition.” Id. at 75.
329 Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisdprudence
of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 346 (1995). See generally The Constitution and
the Economy: Accountability and Autonomy in a Time of Financial Market and Regulatory
Transformations, Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 2010 Annual Meeting Hot
Topic Programs (Jan. 7, 2010) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Economy], available
at
https://memberaccess.aals.org/eWeb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=AALS&WebKey=
b8e081a5-3c1b-41ca-8c1f-c9d84b62a02f&RegPath=EventRegFees&REg_evt_key=
e95fe6b3-00bd-4570-950c-d1bfa09e510c. In this panel discussion, conservative scholar
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Liberal scholars and jurists are more likely to defend broad
delegations that allow administrative agencies to operate with
enormous policy-making discretion.330 This is unfortunate since
such broad delegations often invite “agency capture,” the
dynamic in which regulated industries are able to influence and
dominate the agencies charged with their regulation. The
symbiotic relationships between regulators, legislators, and
private industry are often referred to as “iron triangles,” with
each group exchanging favors to remain entrenched at the
expense of the general public, taxpayers, and consumers.331
In September 2010, Reuters published a special investigation
report of the Federal Reserve’s selective disclosure of sensitive
information about monetary policy to its favored clientele in the
private financial sector. These backroom exchanges are among
the many quid pro quos in a system of opaque subsidies and part
of a bigger problem of private financial influence over economic
decision-making.332 It is the Public Choice school that has
perhaps most thoroughly analyzed the market for legislation and
political favors: private industry provides significant campaign
contributions to Congress and lobbies on behalf of agency
prerogatives while also providing lucrative jobs for their allies
when they retire from the legislative branch and regulatory
agencies—the so-called “revolving door” phenomenon.333
The present financial crisis has added to our understanding
of agency capture in at least two important ways. First, we see
that the “revolving door” swings both ways as private industry

Richard Epstein criticized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as an abuse of
discretion by the Treasury Department, while liberal scholar Mark Tushnet defended
broad delegations as consistent with the requirements of the modern administrative state.
This author questioned the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve as a violation of the
Appointments Clause and the private non-delegation doctrine.
For audio, see
http://www.aalsweb.org/2010podcasts/thursday/hottopicstheconstitutionoftheeconomy.mp
3.
330 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L. J. 97, 141 (2000). See generally The Constitution and the Economy,
supra note 329. Today, conservative hostility to the modern administrative state takes
the form of privatization and fiscal austerity, major features of the Washington
Consensus policy agenda. With the courts no longer vigilant about scrutinizing
delegations, the action has shifted to Congress to downsize the administrative state by
keeping the agencies underfunded while privatizing more and more of their functions.
This agenda has the perverse effect of making administrators more dependent on
industry alliances and therefore more susceptible to capture.
331 Timothy A. Canova, Campaign Finance, Iron Triangles & the Decline of American
Political Discourse, 12 NEXUS 57, 58 (2007).
332 Cooke et al., supra note 205.
333 See generally Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339
(1988) (discussing the economic theory of legislation); Stigler, supra note 193; Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976);
Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 384.
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officials take on key roles in government and then move easily
back to the private sector. For instance, Robert Rubin moved
from Goldman Sachs to the Clinton White House and Treasury
Department, and then back to Citigroup.334 Former President
Bill Clinton earned more than $109 million within seven years of
leaving the White House, nearly half as a speaker hired by large
financial companies that contributed to Hillary Clinton’s 2008
presidential campaign.335 It should not be forgotten that the
Clinton administration did more to deregulate financial
institutions than perhaps any administration since the 1920s.336
Likewise, there are many similar examples involving central
bank officials. For instance, Alan Greenspan, before chairing the
Fed, was a board member of J.P. Morgan.337 After leaving the
Fed, Greenspan landed on his feet advising the Pacific
Investment Management Company (Pimco), the world’s largest
mutual fund, as well as Deutsche Bank’s investment banking
team.338
The second development made apparent in recent years is
the way top central bank and government officials revolve not
into traditional salaried positions but into investment
opportunities with hedge funds and private equity firms. For
instance, former Fed vice chairman David Mullins became a
partner in Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that
became extremely overleveraged in 1998, suffered catastrophic
losses on derivative bets, and required a multibillion dollar
assistance package brokered by the New York Fed.339 Larry
Summers, after serving as Treasury secretary in the Clinton
administration and before chairing the National Economic
Council in the Obama White House, became a managing director
for D.E. Shaw & Co., one of the nation’s largest hedge funds.340
Meanwhile, former President Clinton brought in more than
$15 million from a private equity investment partnership.341
Perhaps more troubling, if that is possible, is the path of Alan
Greenspan, who after leaving the Fed became an advisor at
Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 386–87.
Matthew Mosk, James V. Grimaldi & Joe Stephens, Clintons Earned $109 Million
in 8 Years, WASH. POST, April 5, 2008, at A1.
336 See Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 387.
337 Alan Greenspan Says Risk Was Underpriced, WHARTON NEWS (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/news/featured-story2966.cfm.
338 PIMCO Hires Greenspan as Consultant, REUTERS (May 16, 2007, 7:30 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1546703720070516; Alan Greenspan to Consult for
Deutsche Bank Corporate and Investment Bank, DEUTSHE BANK (Aug. 13, 2007),
http://www.db.com/presse/en/content/press_releases_2007_3606.htm.
339 See Canova, Financial Market Failure, supra note 15, at 387.
340 Id.
341 See Mosk, Grimaldi & Stephens, supra note 335.
334
335
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Paulson & Co, a giant U.S. hedge fund that earned billions of
dollars in 2007 “when it [correctly] called the collapse in the subprime mortgage market,” a collapse which has been widely
blamed on Greenspan for keeping interest rates low while
neglecting any meaningful regulation of financial institutions.342
Each of these revolving door and “revolving hedge fund”
examples raises the appearance of impropriety and the
possibility of outright quid pro quo corruption, and suggests that
the private financial sector has already compromised and largely
captured our “independent” central bank as well as elected
branches of government.343
The corruption of the elected
branches raises issues beyond the scope of this article, including
proposals to reform the political process, campaign finance and
election laws that have entrenched a feeble two-party system.344
However, even the presently compromised Congress, responding
to pressure from an outraged public, managed to enact provisions
in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 that should provide some measure of increased
transparency for the Federal Reserve.
The dynamics of agency capture and unaccountable central
banking also raises important rule of law and constitutional
concerns. The first sentence of the Constitution states that all
legislative powers shall be vested in Congress.345 When Congress
delegates its legislative powers to an administrative agency
without providing any guidance or limitations on the agency’s
exercise of discretion, it runs afoul of the so-called nondelegation
doctrine.346 Courts therefore require that Congress provide an
“intelligible principle” to guide agency action.347 Although courts
are often satisfied with rather vague and indeterminate

342 Angela Monaghan, Greenspan to Join Paulson as Advisor, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan.
16, 2008, at B4.
343 In 1996, it was revealed that the Federal Reserve had amassed a $3.7 billion
contingency fund (it was unclear what this slush fund was intended to be used for), and
was favoring certain sources in its contracting and procurement, thereby raising conflict
of interest concerns. Richard W. Stevenson, Study Criticizes Federal Reserve as Lax
Manager, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at A1. These revelations certainly pale by
comparison with the trillions of dollars in Federal Reserve spending in more recent years.
344 Kiersh, supra note 212 (documenting that the financial sector is “far and away the
largest source of contributions to federal candidates”).
345 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 1.
346 See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201
(1937). See also Nadine Strossen, Delegation as a Danger to Liberty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV
861, 863–64 (1999) (outlining four ways in which the delegation of Congress’
constitutionally defined lawmaking power undercuts the protection of liberty).
347 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2000)
(dismissing the nondelegation doctrine without reference to delegations to private
groups).
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delegation standards,348 agency discretion is also confined by
Congress through a tapestry of procedural requirements imposed
by legislation, including the Administrative Procedure Act,349 the
Freedom of Information Act,350 the Government in the Sunshine
Act,351 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.352
The elected branches also retain some practical ability in
confining agency discretion when the delegations are made to
public administrative agencies, to officials who are appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate, and when there is
ongoing budgetary oversight by Congress. How much more
problematic when the delegation is being made to an ostensibly
private agency, in which top administrators are not appointed by
the President or confirmed by the Senate, and there is no
budgetary oversight by Congress—the exact kind of private
delegation granted to the Federal Reserve. Judicial insistence on
an intelligible principle is far less meaningful for a private
delegation since privately appointed officials can more easily defy
intelligible principles and other policy guidance provided by the
legislative branch.
During the early- to mid-1930s, when the Supreme Court
was striking down New Deal legislation, often in narrow 5 to 4
votes, there was a consensus among liberal and conservative
justices that such private delegations were illegitimate and
unconstitutional, a violation of the so-called private
nondelegation doctrine.353 In 1935, a unanimous Supreme Court
in A.L.A Schechter Poultry v. United States (the so-called “Sick
Chicken case”) struck down the National Recovery
Administration (NRA), the centerpiece of the early New Deal, as
an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power.354 The NRA,
like the Federal Reserve, was concerned with price stability, only
this time it was attempting to stop a deflationary spiral by
setting minimum prices and wages through private industry
348 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 424 (1944) (upholding the Office of
Price Administration’s authority to impose price controls because Congress provided an
intelligible principle to guide administrators by mandating that prices set be “generally
fair and equitable”).
349 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2007).
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 N.W. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996) (describing the APA as “the bill
of rights for the new regulatory state”).
350 See generally Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2007).
351 See generally Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2007).
352 See generally Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq. (2007).
353 See, e. g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (“This is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an
official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.”).
354 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935).
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trade councils which were dominated by the largest firms in each
industry.355
Justice Cardozo, in his concurring opinion,
characterized the delegation to these private industry trade
councils as a “delegation running riot.”356
Since the late 1930s, the Court has routinely upheld the
authority of administrative agencies through a more expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, while largely ignoring
delegation challenges as long as Congress provided some
intelligible principle in the delegation.357 Many scholars have
criticized this lack of judicial scrutiny of democratic processes
ever since. For instance, in Democracy and Distrust, John Hart
Ely lamented the demise of the nondelegation doctrine as a
“death by association” with pre-1937 substantive due process
decisions and narrow readings of the Commerce Clause: “when
those doctrines died the nondelegation doctrine died along with
them.”358
Delegations to private entities are particularly troubling for
rule of law purposes. According to Mark Bernstein:
Even if one accepts the necessity of broad delegations of legislative
power, the sharing of that power with private interests raises
questions about the recipients’ conflict of interest and accountability
and about agency capture. The risk is not only that power will be
concentrated, but that it potentially may be concentrated in those
unaccountable for their actions.359

As Bernstein further recognized, since such delegations can
shortcut the legislative process, they also create a separation of
power issue and threaten “to upset the delicate balance of
institutional interests that the framers believed would check the
influence of factions.”360

Id. at 550.
Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
132 (1980).
358 Id. at 132, 133. Likewise, such leading political scientists as Theodore Lowi have
derided broad delegations to administrative agencies. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 96–97 (2d ed. 1979). See also
Alan Brinkley, The Challenge to Deliberative, in THE NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN
DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 23, 25 (Alan Brinkley, Nelson W. Polsby & Kathleen M.
Sullivan eds., 1997) (arguing that an anti-populist critique of deliberative democracy “is
visible in the extraordinary, and largely unchallenged, authority of presumed experts on
the Federal Reserve Board to chart the course of our economy”).
359 Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 127 (1989).
360 Id. at 127 n.72 (citing David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers
that Be: Constitutional Purposes of Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 372–73
(1987)).
355
356
357
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The Federal Reserve is indeed “the poster child of an
unconstitutional private delegation.”361 Like the NRA, which was
struck down in Schechter Poultry, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) is dominated by private actors.362 The
presidents of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks
participate on the FOMC are appointed by privately selected
board members.363 Meanwhile, unlike delegations to public
agencies, the Federal Reserve does not rely on Congress for
budgetary appropriations since it is effectively able to print
money by simply purchasing government securities (and now
toxic assets) with Federal Reserve Notes and credits representing
Federal Reserve Notes.364 In addition, the Federal Reserve is
exempt in whole or in part from much of the tapestry of
administrative procedural requirements that apply to most other
federal agencies.365
The private nature of the regional Federal Reserve Banks
may also skew the dynamics of the publicly appointed Board of
Governors (BOG).366 The seven members of the BOG, who serve
for fourteen-year terms, are likely to be pre-screened in the
appointments process to prevent any nominees who would
challenge the private nature of the regional Federal Reserve
Banks, the composition of the FOMC, or the prerogatives of the
largest private bank members of the system—the so-called “Too
Big To Fail” banks.367 For instance, the Federal Reserve is
provided with considerable discretion in its open market
operations, deciding what assets to purchase from which
financial settings, as well as in setting capital standards for
individual banks, bringing formal capital enforcement actions,
entering written agreements, ordering hearings, imposing cease
and desist orders, ordering prompt corrective action directives,
appointing a receiver, and conducting “stress tests” to determine
361 Once again, I credit the late John Hart Ely, for this description of the Federal
Reserve. See Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 407 n.326.
362 Bernstein, supra note 359, at 111.
363 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2,
at 53–54; Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 407.
364 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2,
at 2, 62–64.
365 See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2007) (providing exemption
for certain Federal Reserve directives and information that is part of its deliberative
process); Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4 (b) (2007) (exempting any
advisory committee of two entities, the Federal Reserve System and the Central
Intelligence Agency, from provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
366 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1947, supra note 2,
at 56.
367 Id.
See
also
Too
Big
to
Fail,
BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/too-big-to-fail.html (last visited Jan. 6,
2011).
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how much capital is needed by the largest bank holding
companies.368
Such discretion presents challenges for fair
enforcement and supervision by any federal agency, such as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency. The problem becomes magnified
when the discretion is vested in an institution like the Federal
Reserve that is largely directed by the financial industry.
Although there have been numerous challenges to the
Federal Reserve System in the 1970s and 1980s on Appointments
Clause and nondelegation grounds, all have been dismissed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on narrow
procedural grounds (and the Supreme Court has denied
certiorari).369 The D.C. Circuit has held that private plaintiffs
lack standing because they cannot show any injury caused
directly by the Federal Reserve since they lack any privity of
contract with the Fed.370 When the plaintiff has been a U.S.
Senator, the court has created the doctrine of “equitable
discretion” to avoid ruling on the substantive merits.371 If
standing and justiciability could be found in some future case,
perhaps for a private financial institution or state governments
challenging the Fed’s denial of assistance, the issue may turn to
redressability.
Most recently, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board,372 the Supreme Court struck down
the removal provisions of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB),373 a creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,374 since PCAOB board members could be removed
only for good cause by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the SEC Commissioners could in turn only be removed
by the President for good cause.375 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Breyer warned of a host of other federal agencies that
may be put in jeopardy by the majority’s ruling, and he included

368 Julie Andersen Hill, Ad Hoc Bank Capital Requirements 3–5, 8, 11, 15, 19, 21–22,
37 (July 7, 2010) (working draft) (on file with author).
369 Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 404–05 n.309–11, 313 (citing
Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (dismissed on grounds of
equitable discretion); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissed for lack of standing); Riegle v. Fed. Open
Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dismissed on grounds of equitable discretion);
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)
(dismissed for lack of standing)).
370 Id. at 404. See also Reuss, 584 F.2d at 470–71.
371 Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 404.
372 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
373 Id. at 3147.
374 Id.
375 Id.
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the Federal Reserve Board although its members are subject to
good cause removal by the President.376 Justice Breyer follows a
long line of liberal scholars, including most famously Cass
Sunstein, who confuse the Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
properly appointed by the President of the United States and
confirmed by the Senate, with the constitutionally far more
problematic presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks
who sit on the Federal Open Market Committee.377 Of particular
importance in light of Free Enterprise Fund is the fact that those
regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents are removed only by
the privately-elected boards of directors of the privately-owned
regional Federal Reserve Banks.378 It appears that for any
challenge to the Federal Reserve System, the Free Enterprise
Fund holding would provide redressability in the form of striking
down the removal provisions of the regional Federal Reserve
Bank presidents.
It is not surprising that unelected judges would be reluctant
to rule on the substantive merits and strike down key features of
the nation’s central bank. Nor that public opinion and populist
dissatisfaction with Wall Street bailouts finally pushed Congress
to act—even a Congress so compromised and influenced by Wall
Street campaign contributions. Significantly, the impetus for
action came not from the center, but from the populist libertarian
right joining hands with the populist progressive left.
Representative Ron Paul, a Republican libertarian from Texas,
introduced a bill to subject the Federal Reserve to an audit by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the non-partisan
investigative arm of Congress.379 Ron Paul’s bill was cosponsored
on the left by such Democratic and progressive Congressmen as
Dennis Kucinich from Ohio and Alan Grayson from Florida.380
Until now, the Federal Reserve’s exercise of monetary policy has
evaded such scrutiny. But the trillions of dollars in opaque
Federal Reserve subsidies for Wall Street interests finally fueled
376 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 08-861, slip op. at 39
(U.S. June 28, 2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
377 Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 224, at 404 n.310.
378 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 341 Fifth (2000). Unlike the PCAOB removal
provision that was struck down in Free Enterprise Fund, the President of the United
States has no role, direct or attenuated, in the removal of Federal Reserve Bank
presidents. Free Enterprise Fund restricts PCAOB board members to a single level of
insulation from the President; Federal Reserve Bank presidents are completely insulated
from the President of the United States. See Ira Stoll, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
FUTUREOFCAPITALISM.COM (June 28, 2010, 12:39 PM), http://www.futureofcapitalism.com/
2010/06/free-enterprise-fund-v-pcaob.
379 Arnold Kling, The Case for Auditing the Fed is Obvious, CATO INSTITUTE BRIEFING
PAPERS no. 118, Apr. 27, 2010, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/bp/bp118.pdf.
380 Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009, H.R. 1207, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR01207:@@@P.
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reform efforts. Inquiring minds wanted to know who the Federal
Reserve has showered with its largesse—which “Too Big To Fail”
Wall Street banks and which politically connected hedge funds—
and the terms of such support, including the price paid for toxic
assets and the collateral required for Fed loans.
In December 2009, the House passed a financial regulatory
reform bill by a vote of 223 to 202 which incorporated several
provisions on reforming the Federal Reserve, including the GAO
audit provision.381 The Senate passed a financial reform bill in
May 2010 that included a provision that would have required the
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be
appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by
the Senate.382 The Senate bill also prohibited bank officers from
serving on the boards of the twelve regional Federal Reserve
Banks and voting for the regional bank presidents.383 In
addition, the Senate voted 96 to 0 to include a provision requiring
a one-time audit of the Federal Reserve by GAO, a measure that
was pushed from the left by Senator Bernard Sanders, an
independent from Vermont.384
With two differing versions of financial regulatory reform,
the legislation moved to a House-Senate Conference Committee,
where reform efforts often get watered down or die. The final
version of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) did not include any significant
change in the appointment of any of the regional Federal Reserve
Bank presidents.385 Previously, they were appointed by the
boards of directors of the regional Federal Reserve Banks, which
consists of three Class A directors representing the commercial
bank members of the Federal Reserve district, three Class B
directors also elected by the same commercial banks but
purporting to represent the public, and three Class C directors
appointed by the Board of Governors.386 Under section 1107 of
the Act, the regional presidents will now be appointed by the
381 Comparing the House and Senate Financial Reform Bills, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/16/business/financialreformbillcompare.html#tab=2.
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Votes Unanimously for an Audit of Fed’s Actions in
Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at B3; Alan Grayson, We Beat the Fed, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2010, 10:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-alangrayson/we-beat-the-fed_b_572713.html.
385 In the Senate version, section 1157 proposed that the President of the United
States appoint the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for a term of five
years. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (Senate version). However, this proposal was not in
the final version signed by President Obama. See infra note 388 and accompanying text.
386 THE FEDERAL RESERVE: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 2005, supra note 4, at 10.
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Class B and Class C directors of the regional Federal Reserve
Banks, with the approval of the Board of Governors.387 This is a
baby step in the right direction, but with the Federal Reserve
System already captured by the big banking interests, limiting
the appointment process to Class B and Class C directors will
likely have no actual impact on outcomes.
In addition, the prohibition against bank officers serving on
the boards of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks was
dropped by the Conference Committee and did not appear in the
final Dodd-Frank Act.388 However, the Comptroller General is
now required to complete an audit of the governance of the
Federal Reserve Banks, including an examination of whether the
current system of appointing Federal Reserve Bank directors
effectively represents the public “with due but not exclusive
consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry,
services, labor, and consumers.”389 The audit must also “examine
whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest created
when directors of the Federal reserve banks” are elected by
member banks.390 Finally, the audit is charged with identifying
changes to the selection procedures for Federal Reserve Bank
directors that would improve how the public is represented,
eliminate actual or potential conflicts of interest in bank
supervision, and increase the availability of information and
Federal Reserve transparency, effectiveness and efficiency.391
More controversial were the provisions dealing with the GAO
audit of the Federal Reserve’s open market operations and
lending facilities over the past two years, as well as Federal
Reserve’s transparency provisions. It is worth wading through
the maze of statutory provisions to understand the subterfuges
attempted by the Federal Reserve and its allies in the Conference
Committee. According to section 1109(a), the GAO will conduct a
one-time audit of all loans and other financial assistance
provided by the Federal Reserve System during the period
beginning December 1, 2007 and ending on the date of enactment
of the Dodd-Frank Act.392 This, at first glance, seems to be a
387 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (2010) § 1107(a). In addition, § 1108 (d) limits the ability of the Board of
Governors to delegate certain authority to the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks.
388 The Senate version of section 1157 proposed that no officer, past or current, may
serve on the board of directors. H.R. 1157, 111th Cong. (2010) (Senate version). This
prohibition did not appear in the final version signed by President Obama; instead, an
audit is required. See infra note 389.
389 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (2010) § 1109 (b)(1)(B)(i).
390 § 1109 (b)(1)(B)(ii).
391 § 1109 (b)(1)(B)(iv).
392 The Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Purchase Program, by which the Federal
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success for transparency efforts since the GAO audit should
apparently cover the several trillion dollars in loans and outright
purchases made by the Federal Reserve since the onset of the
financial crisis.
However, section 102(a) prevents the Comptroller General
from disclosing “to any person or entity, including Congress, the
names or identifying details of specific participants in
any . . . covered transaction” including the amounts transferred
in any covered transaction.393 GAO disclosure can only occur if
the Board of Governors first decides to publicly disclose the
identity or identifying details of the transaction.394 There is
concern that these provisions could be used to effectively prevent
disclosure by either the Federal Reserve or the GAO of any of the
trillions of dollars of Federal Reserve loans and open-market
purchases conducted between the beginning of the financial crisis
in late 2007 and July 2010.395
However, section 1109(c), the final provision in the Title XI
Federal Reserve provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, required the
Board of Governors to publish on its website no later than
December 1, 2010 the identities of each business, individual,
entity, or foreign central bank that has received specifically listed
Federal Reserve loans and financial assistance beginning on
Reserve purchased some $1.25 trillion in toxic assets, is indeed covered by the GAO’s onetime audit as an expressly listed program (it is specifically listed as “the agencyguaranteed mortgage-backed securities program”). According to the Federal Reserve, the
MBS Purchase Program for large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) was conducted pursuant
to section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act (and therefore was not within the Fed’s section
13(3) powers). See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet
January 2010, at 4 (2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
monthlyclbsreport201001.pdf; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Reserve System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet
March 2010, at 4, 5 (Mar. 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
monthlyclbsreport201003.pdf.
393 § 1102(a).
394 Id. Presumably, the GAO would not be empowered to disclose the details of noncovered transactions. Meanwhile, according to section 1102 the Board of Governors must
disclose the names and identifying details of each counterparty in any covered
transaction. Id. (enacting a new section 11(s) of the Federal Reserve Act). However,
section 1102 requires Federal Reserve to disclose identifying details of only certain
transactions conducted after the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. The GAO’s
non-disclosure obligation expires with respect to any transaction “on the date on which
the Board of Governors, directly or through a Federal reserve bank, publicly discloses the
identity” or identifying details of any transaction. Id. Therefore, when the Board of
Governors discloses details of any post-July 2010 transaction, the GAO may at that time
also disclose such details. But the inverse is also true, that as long as the Board of
Governors does not disclose details of any post-July 2010 transaction, the GAO may not
disclose such details.
395 While the GAO should be able to audit Federal Reserve loans and open-market
transactions under section 1109, the GAO would apparently be prevented from disclosing
the identities and identifying details of these transactions under section 1102. Id.; § 1109.
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December 1, 2007.396 Why, one might ask, were these provisions
so convoluted? Why prevent the GAO from disclosing identifying
information when the Federal Reserve is required to do so on its
website, and why tack that latter requirement onto the very final
section of the legislation? According to a Capitol Hill staffer who
worked on this legislation, “When you are fighting the Fed and
the Senate and Treasury and they won’t show you language, this
is what happens.”397
On December 1, 2010, the Fed complied with section 1109(c)
by disclosing the identities of those receiving some $3.3 trillion in
Federal Reserve loans and financial assistance. The list of wards
of the Fed included the largest financial institutions in the
United States and abroad, a who’s who of Wall Street and foreign
banks.398
Finally, section 1103(b) states expressly that it is not
intended to affect any pending litigation or lawsuit previously
filed under 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Freedom of Information Act.399
This provision was meant to protect suits that had been filed
against the Federal Reserve by Bloomberg News and other media
outlets seeking the identity of financial institutions receiving
emergency Federal Reserve loans from the Federal Reserve’s
discount window and the collateral posted for such assistance.400
This was the one Fed lending program that Congress ultimately
excluded from the transparency and disclosure requirements in
the Dodd-Frank Act.401 Bloomberg News was granted summary
judgment in August 2009 by the federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York,402 which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in March 2010.403
Apparently there was no need for the Federal Reserve to appeal
the decision to the Supreme Court.
The Clearing House

§ 1109(c).
Email from unnamed Capitol Hill staffer to author, July 28, 2010 (adding, “The
process was a clusterfuck done at the last minute”). Clusterfuck, URBANDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=clusterfuck (last visited Jan. 8, 2011)
(Clusterfuck is a “[m]ilitary term for an operation in which multiple things have gone
wrong” and is related to SNAFU and FUBAR).
398 Craig Torres and Scott Lanman, Fed Names Recipients of $3.3 Trillion in Crisis
Aid, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1201/fed-names-recipients-of-3-3-trillion-of-aid-during-u-s-financial-crisis.html.
399 § 1103(b) (enacting a new section 11(s)(8) of the Federal Reserve Act).
400 See generally Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F.
Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
401 Torres & Lanman, supra note 398.
402 Id. at 282.
403 Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 151
(2d Cir. 2010).
396
397
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Association LLC, a group of the biggest commercial banks in the
country, filed for certiorari in October 2010.404
The Fed has never disclosed the identities of borrowers of its
discount window lending since the program was created in
1914.405 As Senator Bernie Sanders said, the Dodd-Frank Act
disclosure and transparency requirements is “a significant step
forward in opening the veil of secrecy that exists in one of the
most powerful agencies in government.”406 Whether or not the
Fed is ultimately compelled to disclose details about its discount
window lending, the information already disclosed under DoddFrank contributes to our understanding of the Fed’s cozy
relationship with Wall Street’s biggest banks and financial
institutions. Most recently, the Federal Reserve is engaged in its
second round of quantitative easing (QE2), purchasing some $600
billion in long-term Treasury securities in an attempt to push
down mortgage interest rates and to prop up housing and
consumption.407 The Fed’s disclosures under Dodd-Frank show
how the first round of quantitative easing helped transfer $1.25
trillion of toxic assets from the balance sheets of Wall Street’s

404 Bob Ivry & Greg Stohr, Fed Won’t Join Supreme Court on Loan Disclosures,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2010, 11:15 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-26/fedwon-t-join-banks-appeal-to-high-court-over-emergency-loan-disclosures.html;
Pending
Cases Involving the Board of Governors, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/legaldevelopmentscases.htm (last updated
Jan. 19, 2011) (reporting the Clearing House filing as intervenor in Board of Governors v.
Bloomberg, LP and Fox News Network v. Board of Governors); Bob Ivry, Fed Given 60
Days for Supreme Court Appeal of Document Disclosure Order, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-08-27/federal-reserve-given-60-days-toappeal-disclosure-order-to-supreme-court.html.
405 Ivry & Stohr, supra note 404.
406 Torres & Lanman, supra note 398.
407 Wessel, supra note 204, at A4 (reporting that Quantitative Easing is “when the
Fed turns up its electronic printing presses” and creates money to purchase financial
assets). Section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act continues to grant the Federal Reserve very
broad discretion to engage in emergency lending—the Fed’s so-called section 13(3) lending
authority—“for the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a
failing company . . . .” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1101(a)(6)(B)(i) (2010). There is nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act
that would prevent the Federal Reserve from create new money to purchase more trillions
of dollars in paper assets through open market transactions. Paul Krugman has
suggested that the Federal Reserve may need to purchase between $8 trillion and $10
trillion in government bonds to produce a full recovery. Paul Krugman, On Quantitative
Easing and the Currency Situation, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2010, 5:30 PM), available at
http://www.marketobservation.com/blogs/index.php/2010/10/14/paul-krugman-onquantitative-easing-and-the-currency-situation?blog=10 (providing an audio broadcasting
of Paul Krugman’s predictions). This is another way of saying that the federal
government needs to find outlets to spend on that scale. The Federal Reserve already has
all the authority it needs to purchase government bonds in any amount, while it would
take an act of Congress to authorize the federal government to spend such amounts (or
any amount) on economic recovery programs.
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biggest banks to the Federal Reserve’s own balance sheet.408
Meanwhile, as home foreclosures have climbed to an all-time
high,409 economists on both sides of the spectrum have called on
the Federal Reserve to lend directly to Main Street, from
proposals to finance the write-down and modifications of
mortgages to lending directly to local governments and for job
creation through infrastructure investment.410 Unfortunately,
these proposals have fallen on deaf ears at the Fed.
The Federal Reserve sits at the center of these double
standards. Sanctity of contract and market discipline result in
millions of underwater mortgages, foreclosed homes, and a
broken American Dream. But for powerful Wall Street insiders,
failure is rewarded through the central bank’s programs such as
quantitative easing. This is essentially free money for the
interests that have captured the central bank, while state and
local governments around the United States, and sovereign
borrowers elsewhere face rising interest rates and negative
assessments from the credit rating agencies tied to the big banks.
Populist proposals to reverse these trends are routinely
dismissed by Washington and Wall Street. One such proposal,
for the Federal Reserve or Treasury to provide interest-free loans
to state and local governments for capital investment projects,
has met orthodox opposition.411 For instance, Don Brash, the
former head of New Zealand’s central bank, indicated his concern
about the opportunity cost of having the government provide
easy credit for public sector capital investment.412 However, as
long as central bankers remain unaccountable there is no
408 Dick Armey & Matt Kibbe, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s Bailout Redux, WASH.
EXAMINER (Nov. 4, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/2010/11/dickarmey-and-matt-kibbe-fed-chairman-ben-bernankes-bailout-redux; Larry Doyle, Barack
Obama Has Ben Bernanke by the Balls, SENSE ON CENTS (Mar. 16, 2010, 3:23 PM),
http://www.senseoncents.com/2010/03/barack-obama-has-ben-bernanke-by-the-balls/.
409 See Foreclosure Activity Hits Record High in Third Quarter, REALTYTRAC (Oct. 15,
2009), http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure/foreclosure-rates.html (reporting a new high
in quarterly mortgage foreclosure rate).
410 For instance, on the right, Nobel laureate Vernon Smith has proposed that the
Federal Reserve finance lending modification of home mortgages. Vernon L. Smith, Mired
in Disequilibrium: Do for Households What the Fed Sought for Banks, NEWSWEEK (Jan.
24, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/2011/01/23/mired-in-disequilibrium.html. On the
left, William Greider proposes that the Fed use its section 13(3) authority to lend to
nonfinancial entities in “unusual and exigent circumstances” to lend directly to local
governments and for building infrastructure and creating jobs. William Greider, Will the
Federal Reserve’s $900 Billion Be Enough?, AGENCE GLOBAL (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2452.
411 Canova, supra note 321, at 586–87 n.167–73 (discussing H.R. 1452, the State and
Local Government Empowerment Act of 1999).
412 Discussion with Don Brash, Chapman University, Argyros Hall, Feb. 22, 2010.
“[T]he opportunity cost of using a particular resource is defined as the value of the next
best alternative use of that resource . . . . ‘[W]henever you have a choice, there is a cost.’”
HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 4 (1998).
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incentive for them to ask what the opportunity cost is for
providing trillions of dollars in support to Wall Street banks and
hedge funds.
The movement to reform central banks and make them
accountable has been around for as long as there has been both
democracy and privatized central banking. Reigning in privilege
and financial aristocracy was the basis for Jefferson’s opposition
to the First Bank of the United States413 and Jackson’s veto of
the recharter of the Second Bank of the United States.414
Likewise, today many have come to see the independent Federal
Reserve as the linchpin of a government-nurtured cartel and
emblematic of the ossification of the political process.415 Without
genuine accountability, independent central banking has become
a euphemism for plutocracy and financial oligarchy.
Those concerned about our present economic impasse must
ask what kind of central bank we need. They may find that the
Federal Reserve we want looks a lot like the Federal Reserve we
once had during the 1940s—strictly accountable to the elected
branches and far more transparent and efficient in regulation
than today. Of course, there are other models of civic republicanism, such as a central bank that remains independent from
direct executive branch political control, while including a fair
representation of “business, labor, farmers, consumers,” debtors,
and other constituencies that have been left outside the present
system.416
This would transform the central bank into a
marketplace for ideas, internalizing checks and balances, and a
forum for what Madison called faction confronting faction.417
It has been said that war is too important to be left to the
generals. Likewise, the economy is too important to be left to the
bankers. Yet, we have largely turned over the nation’s central
bank to a self-interested banking elite. The result has been to
corrupt the culture of the central bank, entrench a system of selfregulation for the biggest banks, and constrain fiscal policy at
every level of government. Ultimately, what is at stake is the
nature of representative democracy itself.

413 Primary Source: Thomas Jefferson's Opinion on the National Bank, (PBS/KCET
2008), http://www.pbs.org/kcet/andrewjackson/edu/jeffersononbank.pdf.
414 American President: Jackson Vetoes Bank Bill—July 10, 1832, Miller Center of
Public Affairs, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/
events/07_10.
415 Jacob Heilbrunn, Op-Ed., Bernanke Bashers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A27.
416 See, e.g., COMMONS, supra note 22, at 900–01; Whalen, supra note 84, at 564–65;
KEYSERLING, supra note 22, at 111.
417 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 312, at 54–55.

